Joseph George Caldwell
Copyright © 2018 Joseph George Caldwell. All rights reserved. Posted at Internet website http://www.foundationwebsite.org. May be copied or reposted for non-commercial use, with attribution to author and website. Updated July 29, 2018
Synopsis. This radio play addresses the issues of human overpopulation and global nuclear war. The play describes the reasons why global nuclear war is likely to happen and considers a scenario in which Russia prevails after the war. Scene 1 describes the destruction to the biosphere that is being caused by large human numbers and industrial production. Scene 2 is a meeting with the Russian President, Prime Minister, and ministers of three portfolios – economic development, natural resources and environmental protection, and defense – in preparation for an annual presentation to Russia’s Duma. Scene 3 describes the state of Russia’s economy, and Scene 4 describes the state of its natural resources and environment. Scene 5 describes the nature and likelihood of nuclear war. Scene 6 describes goals, decision criteria, and strategy related to nuclear war. Scene 7 describes tactics for waging nuclear war. Scene 8 describes possibilities that might arise when access to important situational information is lost during nuclear war. Scene 9 describes implications of Russian goals and decision criteria, including discussion of how a small nuclear conflict could escalate to a large-scale one, and how Russia might prevail in such a war and establish a long-term-sustainable planetary management system. Scene 10 discusses long-term-sustainable population levels. Scene 11 discusses the state of the world twenty years after global nuclear war and Scene 12 describes an evening somewhere on the North American Great Plains, 500 years after the war.
Production Notes. Scenes 3 and 4 may be omitted for an abbreviated version of the play. Scenes 6 and 7 may be omitted for a further abbreviation. The play includes four sets: Scene 1 takes place in a radio studio, located anywhere in the world. Scenes 2-10 take place in a meeting room in the Kremlin, Moscow, Russia; Scene 11 takes place in the office of a human-resource officer in the Office of Planetary Management in Astoria, Oregon, 20 years after the occurrence of a global nuclear war; Scene 12 takes place outside a tepee on the North American Great planes, 500 years after this war.
Contents
Scene 1. Trashing the Planet, Trashing Humankind
Scene 2. Preparing for the Duma
Scene 4. Russian Natural Resources
Scene 5. The Nature and Risk of Nuclear War
Scene 6. Goals, Decision Criteria, and Strategy Related to Nuclear War
Scene 7. Tactics for Waging Nuclear War
Scene 8. Decisions Under Uncertainty
Scene 9. Some Implications of Russian Goals and Decision Criteria
Scene 10. Some Discussion of Sustainable Population Levels
Scene 11. In the Office of Planetary Management
Scene 12. Empire of the Summer Moon Redux
SCENE. The time is the near future. The location is a radio studio anywhere in the world. A panel of five radio/television announcers is seated behind a large desk, facing the audience. In front of them on the desk are sets of papers from which they are reading. As they speak, they look directly toward the audience, as if it were a television camera.
ANNOUNCER 1. A new report was released this week, summarizing the state of the planet and humankind. The report covers a lot of ground, and we are going to summarize just the major sections, dealing with the environment, social and economic issues, and health.
The main factor underlying all of these issues is the size and growth of the human population. The current size of the human population is about eight billion people. The planet’s human population increases by about one percent a year, or about 80 million people per year. The rate of increase is slowing, but global population is expected to rise to at least ten billion people.
In what follows, we will be focusing on absolute numbers, rather than percentages, since percentages often mask the magnitudes of conditions.
ANNOUNCER 2. First, the environment. This past year, large human numbers and industrial production resulted in the following activity and events.
1. Plastic waste. Production of almost three trillion pounds of waste plastic, much of which is floating in the world’s oceans.
2. Toxic chemicals. Production of almost five million tons of toxic chemicals, most of which is contaminating the land and eventually ending up in lakes and oceans.
3. Fossil fuels. Consumption of almost 100 million barrels of oil, seven billion tons of coal and three trillion cubic meters of natural gas, leading to the emission of ten billion tons of carbon products into the atmosphere.
4. Nuclear waste. Production of 12 thousand tons of high-level nuclear waste.
5. Natural habitat destruction. Destruction of tens of millions of hectares of natural habitat, leading to the endangerment or extinction of countless plant and animal species.
6. Deforestation. Deforestation of seven million hectares.
7. Topsoil loss. Destruction of almost two percent of the planet’s remaining topsoil, from erosion and use of chemicals.
In summary, the destruction of the Earth’s biosphere by large human numbers and industrial activity is massive today, and it will continue as long as human population remains at high levels.
To date, large human numbers and industrial activity have caused the following changes to the Earth’s environment.
1. Natural habitat destruction. Conversion of more than half of the world’s natural land to human habitat, resulting in the endangerment and extinction of countless species.
2. Deforestation. Destruction of over half of the world’s forests.
3. Topsoil loss. Because of industrial agriculture, loss of half of the planet’s topsoil.
4. Pollution. Serious pollution of the planet’s land, water and air.
5. Fishery collapse. Because of industrial fishing, overfishing, pollution and climate change, the collapse of fish stocks for many species in many places. It is predicted that all species of wild-caught seafood will collapse, worldwide, by 2050.
6. Destruction of coral reefs. Large-scale destruction of coral reefs, which are essential to fish, by water pollution, sedimentation, and poison and dynamite fishing.
7. Destruction of wild rivers. Destruction of thousands of miles of wild rivers from dams and industrial pollution.
In summary, large human numbers and industrial activity have caused substantial changes to the biosphere.
ANNOUNCER 3. In the economic area, the situation is as follows.
1. Poverty. Approximately 80 percent of the human population, or six billion people, live in dismal poverty, with no hope of a better life for themselves or their children. Most people are not just poor, but they are living in extreme deprivation and desperation. As long as human population levels remain high, most of the people born each year are doomed to a life of poverty, with little or no access to a high or even modest quality of life. Each year, the world’s human population increases by about 80 million people, and each year, the number of people born to a life of poverty and deprivation increases by this amount.
2. Extreme poverty. The report points out that the number of people in extreme poverty, living on about US$1.25 per day, has been decreasing. The report points out that this indicator has been criticized as an invalid measure of poverty. That amount – US$1.25 a day – is absurdly low. It is less than what many people in the US spend on pet food. It is not a reasonable poverty level for human beings. At higher poverty levels, such as US$5 or US$10 per day, which are still severe, the number of people living in poverty is extremely large – many billions – and increasing by large amounts – tens of millions – every year.
3. Wealth. The wealthiest one percent of the populations owns half of the world’s wealth. The Gini coefficient, which is a measure of the distribution of wealth, continues to increase, showing high and increasing disparity.
4. Economic activity and growth. The policy of all nations is increased economic activity and growth. The level of economic activity is estimated at 80 trillion US dollars, and economic production grew by three percent. In the past, as economic activity increased, the rate of destruction of natural habitat and species always increased.
5. Disdain for animal life. Production of animal food for human consumption resulted in the slaughter of 1.5 billion cattle, 1.5 billion sheep and goats, .9 billion pigs, and 15 billion poultry. An estimated 100 million tons of fish and seafood were harvested. Each head of cattle produces about 100 kilograms of methane each year, which is released into the atmosphere as a greenhouse gas.
6. Access to resources. As a direct result of large human numbers, most people on the planet have limited or no access to the planet’s natural resources, such as arable land. They are severely constrained, by limits on natural ability, knowledge, skills and access to resources, to control their lives or to achieve meaningful life accomplishments.
7. Ignorance. An estimated one billion people are living in ignorance, either functionally illiterate or innumerate. These people have limited ability to acquire knowledge or skills, and thereby benefit from past human experience and accomplishments.
8. Desperation, meaningless lives, hopelessness, unhappiness. The numbers of children engaged in labor is estimated to be 200 million, of whom 10 million are engaged in forced labor. The number of women forced into prostitution is estimated to be five million. The number of suicides is estimated at 800 thousand per year. Because of large human numbers and crowding, most people alive today will never realize happiness, the ability to achieve meaningful life accomplishment, or even accomplish modest goals. As population and overcrowding continue, human misery will continue. As population and overcrowding increase, human misery will increase.
ANNOUNCER 4. In the area of crime and violence, the following is reported.
1. Crime. Most of the human population now lives in cities, in deplorable conditions – poverty, crowding, unemployment, meaningless work, hunger, disease, stress, violence and crime. As human numbers continue to increase, crowding will increase. Crime and violence are rampant. Gang violence continues at a high level. The global number of murders is estimated at about half a million per year. Political corruption continues at a high level in many countries. Barring a substantial decrease in human numbers, for most people there is little to no hope for a better future for themselves or their children.
2. Drug abuse. The number of people misusing drugs is estimated to be 30 million. The economic cost of drug abuse is estimated to be about one trillion dollars per year.
3. Family dysfunction. In many countries, family dysfunction is severe, resulting in many broken homes, child abuse, juvenile delinquency and domestic violence.
4. Incarceration. The estimated number of people incarcerated is estimated to be nine million. In the United States, the number is about two million, or about .7 percent of the population. The average length of a prison term is about five years in the US, and two to three years in many other countries. In the US, a substantial number of people are incarcerated for periods of longer than ten years. The proportion incarcerated for drug-related crimes is about half. In most instances, an incarceration means that the person will never again have meaningful work.
5. Mass migration. High population levels, crowding, political dysfunction, poverty, violence and desperation are causing the migration of millions of disaffected people.
6. National security. The likelihood of global nuclear war remains high. The number of nations possessing nuclear weapons continues to increase.
The incidences and prevalences for many of these conditions do not change much over time. As the human population grows, the numbers will grow. If human population stabilizes, the numbers will remain high.
ANNOUNCER 5. In the area of health, the situation is as follows:
1. Disease. Prevalences for the following communicable diseases are as follows: HIV/AIDS: 40 million; hepatitis: 200 million; parasitic disorders: three billion; tuberculosis: two billion; malaria: 200 million; sexually transmitted diseases: 250 million.
2. Malnutrition. Malnutrition prevalence is two billion, contributing to the deaths of about three million people per year.
3. Hunger. About 800 million people do not have enough food to lead a healthy, active life.
4. Drug abuse. An estimated 30 million people are misusing, abusing or addicted to drugs.
5. Chemotherapy damage. Chemotherapy has caused “chemo-brain” for millions of people, with the direct result for many that they will never again have meaningful work.
6. Depression. About 300 million people suffer from depression.
7. Suicide. Last year, an estimated 800 thousand people committed suicide.
These numbers show that massive numbers of people are afflicted with serious health conditions. These numbers will remain high as long as human population remains high.
ANNOUNCER 1. As a direct result of large human numbers and industrial production, the planet is being trashed, and misery – both human and animal – is being propagated on a massive scale. The magnitude of the number of people living in misery under the current system is staggering, mind-boggling. What on Earth are we doing to our home, to the natural environment in which we evolved and on which our existence depends? The diversity of the planet’s biosphere is being substantially destroyed, threatening to reduce the quality of life for all future generations. The planet is being transformed from a Garden of Eden to a living hell. For what good purpose? Is it worth it? What are people for? What are the benefits of large human numbers and industrial activity, and what are the costs? Who prospers and who loses? Are the planet’s finite and irreplaceable resources, such as fossil fuels and biodiversity, being expended for good purpose? If not, what are the prospects for a solution to this problem? We have summarized the situation. Our distinguished panel will now address these issues….
SCENE. The time is the near future. The location is a small meeting room in the Kremlin, Moscow, Russia. The President, Prime Minister, and three Ministers are in a meeting to discuss input to the upcoming annual meeting of Russia’s legislative body, the Duma. The five are seated around a table that could seat perhaps ten. On the wall behind the table is a large video screen, which is turned off. A lectern has been placed to the right of the screen and table, so that a speaker at the lectern can easily address both the table and the screen. As the meeting begins, the five are seated around the table, generally facing the audience. The President and Prime Minister are seated at the left of the table and three ministers to the right.
PRESIDENT VLAD. OK, people let’s get this meeting underway. This is the first of a series of meetings to discuss input to next month’s Duma. Each meeting will include just a few ministries, so that I will have time to explore issues of interest in some detail. Eventually, I will have discussions with every minister. The Prime Minister will participate in each meeting and provide summary input for ministries not present, as necessary.
Today’s meeting includes the Prime Minister, Vera; the Minister for Economic Development, Eric; the Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, Mariya; and the Minister of Defense, Dimitri. What I want to hear is the key points that you propose to present to the Duma. I don’t want a lot of detail – just the key points. If I want additional detail, I will ask for it. Vera, as Prime Minister, you will summarize the overall presentation. Go ahead. [Vera moves from the table to the lectern.]
PRIME MINISTER VERA. Thank you, Mr. President. As usual, the annual presentation will be made using presentation slides. For today’s meeting, I will summarize key points verbally, but I also have draft versions of slides available if you wish to see them.
PRESIDENT VLAD. That sounds fine. Let’s keep it verbal for now. We may wade into details later on.
VERA. The structure of each ministry’s presentation will be as follows. First will be a brief statement of the ministry’s scope and mission, vision and primary goals. This will be followed by a situation analysis, which includes a summary of the current state of the nation and the world with respect to the ministry’s scope and mission, and a summary of recent significant developments and activities related to the scope and mission.
Then, the results of a SWOT analysis will be presented. As you know, the acronym SWOT stands for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats. We have used that methodology to a limited extent in the analysis of special situations, and it has proved useful. It is a straightforward and orderly structure for summarizing the essence of situations and challenges, and identifying and justifying goals and objectives. A particular strength of the SWOT approach is that it requires examination of weaknesses as well as strengths.
Following the SWOT analysis will be a plan and budget for achieving the ministry’s goals. The plan and budget provide specific, measurable objectives for achieving the goals. The plan will include a one-year short-term version and a long-term version of five years or more. In this meeting we will generally not be discussing specific objectives or plans.
VLAD. I agree that the SWOT methodology has proved useful. But does it suit all ministries, every year? Is it overkill? Do we need it for all ministries, at the present time?
VERA. For some ministries, it is true that things haven’t changed a lot recently, and such an analysis would not vary much from year to year. To some extent, however, significant challenges arise in all ministries. If they don’t, such a ministry would be vulnerable to extinction, by merging with a more significant ministry. In any event, if not much is changing, the SWOT analysis will simply say so, and be brief.
SWOT is a useful framework for planning. It puts things in context. It makes it easier for the audience to assess whether goals are reasonable.
VLAD. OK, fine, let’s do it that way. Scope, mission, vision, goals, situation, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats, plan, budget.
VERA. Thank you. In the background document that I circulated last week, I presented summaries for all ministries, using this format. These summaries were prepared by the ministries over the past couple of months. Today we will be focusing on three areas – economics, natural resources and environmental protection, and defense – in the order in which I just mentioned them.
In today’s meeting, you should not attempt to cover all of the material included in the background document. This is not a rehearsal for the presentation to the Duma. Some items, such as the scope and mission of your ministry, everyone already knows. The purpose of today’s meeting is to identify and discuss key points, especially new or controversial points, to present to the Duma for it to assess the reasonableness of goals and plans.
Today’s meeting is an informal one, with a primary focus of briefing the President and receiving comments from him. Although you will each have the floor for making your presentations, I want the format to allow for free exchange of ideas. If someone has a comment or question, please feel free to interrupt the speaker’s presentation.
OK, let’s proceed.
SCENE. The same as before.
VERA: I will now give the floor to the Minister of Economic Development. Eric, go ahead. [Vera leaves the lectern and returns to her seat at the table.]
MINISTER OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ERIC: Thank you, Madam Prime Minister. [Eric moves from his seat at the table to the lectern.] In summary, Russia’s economy is very strong. In the 1990s, following the break-up of the Soviet Union, we passed through some very difficult times. The move from a command economy to a market economy was slow and painful. That period is now long behind us. Since then, we have had almost two decades of substantial economic restructuring and development. I will now cite a few salient features of the Russian economy.
1. Income. Among the world’s nations, Russia is an upper-middle-income economy. In terms of gross domestic product, or GDP, it ranks sixth in the world in absolute size, and 50th in the world in terms of GDP per capita.
2. Macroeconomic indicators. Unemployment, inflation, and national debt are all low. In terms of these basic macroeconomic indicators, the Russian economy is strong and healthy. Our currency is sound, and our conservative fiscal policy has served us well.
3. Self-sufficiency in natural resources. We are substantially self-sufficient in natural resources. Salient features of the Russian economy are our vast mineral and energy resources. The World Bank estimates that Russia contains over thirty percent of the world’s natural resources, in terms of value. Russia contains the world’s largest reserves of natural gas, the second-largest reserves of coal, and the eighth-largest reserves of oil. We are the leading exporter of natural gas and coal, and the second-largest exporter of oil. We export large amounts of iron, aluminum, gold, nickel and copper. Russia contains more forest than any other country in the world – one fifth of the world’s forests and one-fourth of the world’s wood reserves.
4. Self-sufficiency in manufactured goods. With respect to manufactured goods ranging from consumer products to high-tech military and aerospace applications, Russia is highly self-sufficient. We are not dependent on any external source for critical equipment or components. Just a few years ago, our microelectronics industry lagged, and we imported a lot of key components. That situation is now rectified. Not only are we self-sufficient, but we are becoming a significant exporter in this area. While we may not produce the top of the line in computer central processing units or medical equipment, we are able to maintain a high and quite adequate level of functionality in all areas using our own equipment and components.
5. Exports. The Russian economy is diversified, and our exports are substantial. Our energy, mining and agricultural sectors are very strong. Our manufacturing industries are large. Russia produces about seven percent of the world’s automobiles and trucks, many for export. Our armaments industry is very strong. We produce a substantial array of basic and high-tech military equipment, including firearms, combat aircraft, air defense systems, ships, submarines, military vehicles, short-range and long-range ballistic missiles, and space launch vehicles. The total value of Russian arms exports is second only to the United States. Russia is a major exporter of forest products and wheat.
6. Market-based economy. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, there was a move to restructure the Russian economy from a command economy to a market-based economy, for all sectors except energy and defense. This goal has been achieved. Although painful at times, this transformation has been good for Russia. It has enabled us to achieve rapid economic growth and a vibrant, competitive, stable economy. The high international demand for Russian products demonstrates that we have achieved a high level of efficiency, quality and value-for-money in the markets that we have chosen to enter.
VLAD. Eric, almost all of the points that you have made represent a description of the present situation, but in the main they represent strengths. You do not appear to be following the suggested format – you seem to have jumped right to the “strengths” part of the SWOT analysis. Or were you describing the situation? Since you have not articulated goals, I cannot relate the strengths to goals.
The presentation to the Duma is not just a public relations promotion. It is to present a vision and goals and justification of a plan for achieving those goals. We need more discussion of where we are headed, and why, and how we propose to get there. We need more than simply touting our strengths.
ERIC. OK, I accept your point. The mission, vision and goals are stated in the handout. They are in fact pretty much the same as for last year. I skipped over them in this discussion in response to your request to skip details and focus on key points.
VLAD. OK, I understand. But let’s articulate the goals, before we go further. You may skip the mission statement – I read it. It is general, and not controversial. The vision statement is fine. Let’s move on to the goals. The goals are very important. They are in fact stated in the handout, but I want to subject them to consideration and discussion by the group.
ERIC. Yes, sir. The current economic goals for Russia are as follows:
1. Achieve a high degree of economic self-sufficiency.
2. Achieve a level of national industrial production sufficient at the least to protect Russia’s position among the world’s nations and at the most to achieve Russian hegemony in world affairs.
3. Achieve a high quality of life for Russian citizens.
4. Accomplish dispersal of industrial capacity, to minimize damage from nuclear attack and promote the likelihood that Russia would survive and prevail after a nuclear attack.
VLAD. OK, good. Those are the same goals as last year, and I believe that they are still valid. Does anyone care to comment? [No one chooses to comment.]
VERA. The goals were discussed at length last year. Things haven’t changed much since then. I recommend that we accept them as is for now, and move on to the SWOT analysis. That analysis may suggest revisions.
VLAD. Is everyone comfortable with that?
OTHERS. [Consent.]
ERIC. OK, fine. The points that I made earlier did in fact represent strengths relative to the mission, but they vary in importance relative to individual goals. In fact, the items I stated earlier represent strengths relative to the first three goals, but they do not relate to the last one, of accomplishing dispersal of industrial production. The fact is, decisions on location of industry have been made pretty much on the basis of efficiency – consideration of where is the most efficient location for a new plant. That approach tends to locate new capacity in existing, large cities, close to labor and other inputs.
VLAD. So, what is the present dispersal situation? Is it improving? What steps have been taken to increase dispersal?
ERIC. The major public sectors are energy and defense. Location decisions for those sectors are made by the government. So far, the government has taken limited steps with respect to dispersal. In the private sectors, location decisions have been made largely by entrepreneurs, in accordance with zoning regulations. As of now, most Russian industry is located in large cities, such as Moscow and Ekaterinburg.
VLAD. For a long time, people have not worried much about the prospect of large-scale nuclear war. Recent developments have increased the risk of large-scale nuclear war. The number of states possessing nuclear weapons is increasing, and terrorist regimes and groups are working hard to acquire them. Nuclear weapons are now quite compact, easy to deploy, and relatively easy to employ. We are living on borrowed time. There are forces in the world that want to see nuclear war happen, and they will soon possess the means to accomplish that objective. In view of the situation, it would appear that is just a matter of time until nuclear war occurs. From what you have told me, our economic policies are not well aligned with preparing for it. It appears that you have identified a major weakness here.
ERIC. That is correct. Dispersal of industry is talked about and considered, but most decisions have been made on the basis of economic efficiency, convenience, or even personal whim.
VLAD. We are vulnerable in this area, but we have the means to reduce that vulnerability. I propose that we work to change this.
ERIC. You are talking about making industry location decisions on the basis of expected outcomes of large-scale nuclear war. To date, the emphasis has been on economic recovery, transition to a market economy, economic growth and trade. The primary consideration has been economic efficiency and total production, not nuclear-war survivability. To make rational decisions from that point of view would require war-game analysis of alternative dispersal distributions. That function falls within the bailiwick of the Ministry of Defense, not the Ministry of Economics.
MINISTER OF DEFENSE DIMITRI. Now, wait a minute! You can’t pass the ball that fast! The Ministry of Defense has not been tasked to identify good locations for industries, based on consideration of nuclear-war attacks. We propose good locations for weapons and interceptors and defense shelters, given the current distribution of infrastructure and population. We could do a similar analysis of alternative distributions of industry, but your Ministry never approached us about doing it.
VLAD. OK, hold on, both of you. I agree that this issue involves both ministries. In the past, attention and efforts were rightly focused on getting our economic house in order. In fact, we were in such bad shape that it didn’t really matter much where things were located. But things have changed now. We are now growing fast, and we have much economic power. We are now in the position of being able to disperse our industry. Let’s set up a joint task force to conduct whatever analysis is required, and issue future building permits in an optimal fashion.
ERIC. Are you talking about locations of plants, or also about relocating population? If the latter, that could involve relocating people. Is that on the table?
VLAD. Let’s look at both. The issue is cost-effectiveness of a full range of alternatives. While dispersing existing industry and population would require substantial time and resources, we can move immediately with respect to new building permits, if it appears worthwhile to do so. Keep in mind that the total relocation cost is not just for new factories – it includes the cost of supporting infrastructure, such as electric power, communications, roads, housing, stores, schools, hospitals, and defense shelters. Even if it is determined to be worthwhile to relocate, we can move only so fast, but we do have the national wealth to accomplish substantial change over time. So, Eric and Dimitri, let’s work up objectives to get the analysis done this year.
VERA. If lack of industrial dispersal is a major security weakness, do you want this discussed in this document?
VLAD. No, I don’t.
VERA. Well, what about the SWOT approach – Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats?
VLAD. Well, let’s classify the Defense and Economics portions.
ERIC. OK. Now, let’s move on to the Weaknesses part of the SWOT analysis. Although the economy has very substantial strengths, it also possesses some significant weaknesses. Some of these have persisted for some time, as we focused on reconstruction and growth. Some of them are structural, and difficult to address.
VLAD. Yes, I read your draft. The main weakness is our dependence on export of natural resources, particularly in the energy sector. But go on – it’s your show.
ERIC. Thank you. Yes, as you say, while Russia produces and exports a substantial amount of high-value-added manufactured products, such as armaments, defense systems, cars and trucks, a major portion of its export earnings is from nonrenewable resources, including oil, natural gas, coal, ores and refined metals. Other major natural-resource exports include wood and agricultural products, which are renewable but require substantial energy inputs if they are to continue. These natural resources account for most of our export earnings. I will now summarize the situation with respect to the major resources.
VLAD. OK.
ERIC. In the agricultural sector, we export wheat, which is renewable, but even that consumes a substantial amount of nonrenewable inputs such as petroleum, topsoil, and energy for soil preparation, planting, irrigation, monitoring, harvesting, processing and transport. There are also external costs associated with industrial farming, such as loss of biodiversity, loss of natural habitat, and soil degradation, erosion and poisoning. Industrial farming cannot continue indefinitely without damaging or exhausting the soil. It has been estimated that the world has lost half of its topsoil in the past 150 years. We are doing better than the world average, but we have lost 40 percent. Modifying our agricultural practices is necessary.
In the area of forestry, the situation is even starker. Although Russia owns a fifth of the world’s forest land, at current rates of cutting we will have exhausted our supply of commercial forest within 20 years. The problem here is that we are practicing extensive forestry management, in which we simply clear an area and walk away, instead of intensive forestry management, in which we plant trees to replace the felled ones. The issue here is that intensive forestry management requires substantial labor and energy inputs. Even Canada, with its substantial wealth, has been slow to adopt intensive forestry management practices.
Everyone is familiar with the situation with respect to fossil fuels. Russia has vast quantities of oil, natural gas, and coal, and we are exporting them at a prodigious rate. The industrialized world is rapidly depleting its fossil-fuel reserves. At current rates of consumption, commercially recoverable fossil fuels will disappear within a century or so. We cannot expect to maintain the current level of export income from that source.
In the area of minerals, we export massive amounts of potassic and nitrogenous fertilizers. For most of our minerals, we do not export raw ore, but value-added refined products such as iron, copper, aluminum, nickel and gold metals. Although the reserves of these minerals are substantial, the cost of recovering them increases, as the easily recoverable reserves are exhausted.
The Russian economy is quite dependent on export of natural products. The oil and gas sector accounts for almost 20 percent of GDP, 50 percent of federal budget revenues, and over 70 percent of total exports. Except for cars and defense products, most of our exports are natural products or refined metals.
VLAD. Eric, these facts are well known. Russia has been an exporter of natural products or refined metals for a very long time. Everything we export, except for services, consumes natural-resource inputs. The whole world is consuming the planet’s nonrenewable resources. Russia is very rich in natural resources. As the world runs out of them, we will be among the last to do so.
Our population is low. Most of our depletion of natural resources is not associated with domestic use, but is in support of exports. I agree that the rapid consumption of nonrenewable natural resources cannot go on for long, but this is a threat to the entire industrialized world, not just to Russia. How does this affect Russia differently from anyone else? And what can we do about it, anyway? As you point out, export of natural resources accounts for most of our export earnings, a substantial portion of GDP, and a large portion of federal revenues. We are not about to put the brakes on this, any more than the rest of the world is.
ERIC. Your points are well taken. The entire world is indeed consuming nonrenewable resources at a prodigious rate, and this cannot continue for long. While this situation represents a vulnerability for the whole industrialized world, we can transform this vulnerability into a strength for Russia. It is estimated that Russia contains over 30 percent of the world’s natural resources, estimated in value at close to 100 trillion dollars. The opportunity represented here is to ration our domestic use and export of nonrenewable resources in such a way that the rest of the world runs out well before Russia does. In that way, we are less vulnerable to resource depletion than others, and the value of the last remaining resources – mostly located in Russia – will become very substantial.
As controller of the last of the planet’s nonrenewable resources, Russia will be in a position of great strength. We can do this. Our population is relatively small – actually, very small relative to our land area and natural resources. Compared to the industrialized world as a whole, except for exports we consume our natural resources at a much lower rate.
VLAD. OK, I see your point. You are not proposing a halt on export of natural products, but simply a moderation of the rate such that the rest of the world runs out before we do. Since we possess so much of the world’s resources, we are in a position to do this. OK, I’ll buy that. But I would like to see depletion rates for essential resources, both for Russia and the rest of the world. Then I’d like to see a plan for accomplishing this, and specific objectives to make it happen.
ERIC. OK, I will do that. [Pauses to shuffle papers.] The second major vulnerability relates to the distribution of income and wealth. In the early twentieth century, the income and wealth of most countries of the world, including Russia, were relatively evenly distributed over the population. In Russia, for much of the twentieth century, the top ten percent of income earners earned about twenty percent of total income.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the situation changed drastically. The share of income earned by the top ten percent jumped to 25 percent in 1991, to 48 percent in 1996. It remains today at high levels.
This situation of substantial income disparity is not unique to Russia. The situation in Russia is comparable to that of the United States. Income inequality is measured by a quantity called the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficients for Russia and the US are .38 and .39. For the rest of the economically developed world – the OECD countries – the average value is .32. About half a dozen economically developed countries have higher Gini coefficients than Russia.
VLAD. So, what’s the problem? The income distribution in Russia is no more extreme than in the US or a number of other economically developed countries.
ERIC. Extreme income inequality breeds envy and discontent.
VLAD. But, as you said, our Gini coefficient is no higher than that of the United States and a number of other large economically developed countries. In recent years the Gini coefficient has been rising for many countries, yet they remain politically stable. As long as a country is doing very well financially, as ours is, and its citizens enjoy a reasonable quality of life, as ours do, it appears that they are quite willing to accept a high degree of income inequality.
Polls show that Russians are pleased with the progress that we have made in the past few decades, and with the present situation. Our flat income tax is as equitable as you can get, for an income tax. We are not on the verge of revolution, or of losing elections, over this issue. Our Gini coefficient is not the highest, or even very close to the highest. I don’t see a problem here. If we were doing poorly, I can see that a high Gini coefficient would be cause for concern. But we are not doing poorly. Are you suggesting that we increase income and wealth taxes to make the distribution more even? For what good purpose? What would that accomplish?
ERIC. No, I am not proposing that. I am simply identifying a potential vulnerability. I accept your points, and I will remove income distribution as a weakness.
VLAD. Good. By the way, you mentioned that Russia’s GDP per capita is 50th in the world. That’s 50 out of about 200 countries. If you remove the portion of GDP that is due to export of natural products, the GDP per capita is considerably lower. What are the implications of this? Does it imply that Russian workers are not productive? Does it imply that they are not doing well? Are we achieving our goal of achieving a good quality of life for Russians?
ERIC. The modest level of GDP per capita does not necessarily imply any of these, and none of them is true. A major reason why our GDP per capita is not very high compared to other developed nations is that a substantial portion of our economic activity is in low-wage sectors such as agriculture, mining and logging. It is also due in part to the fact that we aim to be self-sufficient. To that end, we choose to manufacture ourselves what other countries may be able to make for lower cost, because of a comparative advantage. It follows that we have not optimized our economy to maximize GDP per capita. We have other important objectives that take precedence over that.
The low Russian GDP per capita is a reflection of the fact that we have not transformed our country into a giant factory, producing industrial products that ultimately destroy the biosphere. As the US and every other country having a very high GDP per capita has done. Russia has a diversified economy, with room for low-wage occupations such as natural farming, and production of basic goods for basic needs. A substantial portion of our agricultural output is in fact from household plots and peasant farms, not just from corporate farms. In the sector of defense systems, the GDP per capita is quite high. In agriculture, not so high.
There is no reason to strive for a high GDP per capita for its own sake. The important issue is quality of life. A high GDP per capita is not necessarily all good. It can in fact be viewed as a reflection of how much damage a country’s workers are doing to the biosphere. Many countries tout economic growth as an important macroeconomic indicator. In a closed system such as Earth, growth cannot continue forever. You will note that I did not include growth as one of the principal macroeconomic indicators, in the list of economic goals. In the United States, much economic growth is from population growth, which is due mainly to mass immigration. This mass immigration is destroying much space, causing crowding, and radically altering US culture. We value Russian culture, and do not wish to sacrifice it to economic growth.
Our GDP per capita is not very high, but it is quite high enough. We have achieved a good quality of life for Russians. They are not all assembly workers; there is meaningful work for many. Some are rocket scientists, and some are farmers. Many have a reasonable choice of occupation. GDP per capita is an important economic indicator, but by itself is not a very comprehensive indicator. It is a mean, an average value. It does not show the distribution. It measures activity only in monetary terms. It does not reflect whether people are doing work that is meaningful to society or to themselves, or work they find satisfying or enjoy.
VLAD. OK, OK, I appreciate that detailed explanation. Pardon the diversion. You were discussing vulnerabilities of the Russian economy.
ERIC. Yes. To continue, a final vulnerability is the fact that wealthy Russians store a large amount of their wealth outside of Russia. This situation indicates a lack of confidence in the economic and political stability of Russia. It is estimated that an amount equal to three quarters of national income is stored offshore. That is the equivalent of the total financial assets of all Russian households. Offshore wealth is roughly three times larger than official net foreign reserves.
VLAD. Once again, what’s the problem? How is this a serious threat to Russia? I happen to know a little about this. One tenth of the world’s wealth is stored off-shore. In the UK, Spain and France, about 30 per cent to 40 per cent of the wealth of the richest 0.01 per cent of households is held abroad. That percentage is about 60 percent for Russia. But remember, our country suffered a revolution just three decades ago. It is understandable that our wealthy are conservative and cautious. Given these circumstances, the figure is not extreme.
The fact that we allow this can be interpreted as a measure of strength of our system, rather than a weakness. I concede that a certain amount of capital flight has taken place, but many countries are in similar circumstances.
I don’t place much stock in your statement that offshore wealth is a lot greater than net foreign reserves. Given our strong economic position and export markets, we are in a position to control the level of foreign reserves. That level is basically a policy decision. We could balance it with offshore wealth if we wished to.
The magnitude of Russia’s offshore wealth is in fact an indicator of how wealthy we have become. More to the point, if we changed this, how would the nation’s economic security and progress change?
ERIC. If these funds were invested in Russia rather than in other nations, that substantial amount could make a real difference. It could be invested, for example, in improving Russia’s infrastructure, which is not in the best shape, or at the best locations.
VLAD. Our basic economic indicators are sound. While I agree that repatriating these funds could make a significant difference, it would require substantial interference in the business affairs of the entrepreneurs who are doing a good job of making Russia strong economically. If there is anything that we have learned from capitalism, it is that the incentive to become wealthy is a key ingredient affecting the rate of economic growth of a country. Within reason, we should nurture that incentive, not destroy it.
The wealthy of all countries keep wealth abroad. This practice is going to continue, legally or illegally. Every prudent businessman does a risk analysis and takes steps to manage risk. Only people with little to lose have no offshore assets. On this score the practices of our business leaders are quite in line with those of other developed countries, and Russia is in fact no more vulnerable than other economically strong nations.
By the way, if the overseas wealth were returned, it would remain in private hands. If we are to invest in infrastructure, it will be the state doing it for the benefit of people as a whole. We don’t want private ownership of what should be public infrastructure. Investing repatriated funds in infrastructure is not a good example.
ERIC. OK, I accept that. One reason why we have been able to accommodate a certain amount of capital flight is that we are very rich in natural resources. In a sense, we are extracting Russia’s natural resources and storing much of the value from them overseas. If we move to decrease exports of natural products, then the level of overseas wealth, if it remained at current levels, would represent a substantially greater portion of national income.
VLAD. OK, that makes sense. For the time being, however, even though much Russian wealth is stored offshore, Russia still has the wherewithal to accomplish its economic development goals. The level of offshore wealth is not restricting Russia’s economic activity. Unless you have stronger points to make than the ones you just cited, let’s drop this item as a highlighted vulnerability. Continue to monitor the situation and keep me apprised of changes or other developments. If you have some suggestions about how to reduce the capital flight somewhat, or keep it from increasing, please let me know.
ERIC. OK, consider it done. We have now addressed all components of the analysis. I need to work up specific objectives for the coming year, to address Goal 4, on dispersal of industry. They will be included in the next draft, along with a proposed budget.
VLAD. Fine. Thank you, Eric. That was a good discussion of the economic sector. I don’t have any more questions. Vera? [Vlad turns to Vera, evidently asking her to move to the next speaker.]
VERA. Unless someone else has another question, that should wrap up the discussion of the economy. [There are no questions.] Thank you, Eric. [Eric leaves the lectern and returns to his seat at the table.]
SCENE. The same as before.
VERA. Now let’s turn to Natural Resources and Environmental Protection. Mariya, you have the floor. [Mariya moves from her seat at the table to the lectern.]
MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION MARIYA. Thank you, Mr. President. As you see from the draft document, I have prepared a summary in the proposed format. As is the case with other ministries, Russia’s situation with respect to natural resources is intertwined with the situation in other countries and the world. Russia is just one country out of many, and what is being done in the rest of the world affects us more than we affect it. Because of this interdependence, I will discuss Russia’s situation with respect to natural resources in a global context.
VLAD. That sounds fine. Go ahead.
MARIYA. Globally, large human numbers and industrial activity are radically changing the biosphere. Destruction of natural habitat is causing species extinction at a phenomenal rate, far above the natural rate prior to large human population and comparable to that associated with major climate change, such as global warming or an ice age. Burning of the world’s store of fossil fuels is adding a large amount of carbon dioxide and other gasses to the atmosphere, with the potential for significant climate change.
As Eric pointed out, Russia possesses about one third of the world’s natural resources. At the rate at which we are exporting these resources, we are depleting our stocks of oil, natural gas, coal and wood faster than the world as a whole. If current export rates continue, we will exhaust our reserves of these resources before the world as a whole does. We can always grow more wood, but once fossil fuels are gone, they are gone forever.
Really, however, the main issue is not when we run out, or whether Russia runs out before or after the rest of the world. The use of fossil fuels is damaging the biosphere, and we are in the process of exhausting them. For good reason we should stop using them, and the sooner the better.
VLAD. OK, I accept that. But humor me. How much time do we have until fossil fuels are gone?
MARIYA. No one knows for sure, since the total reserves are not known with certainty, and advancing technology changes the amounts that can be commercially extracted. For example, it was believed that oil reserves were about half depleted, when America developed fracking technology and increased known reserves substantially.
VLAD. That’s not a very definite answer.
MARIYA. OK, perhaps a century, maybe two, and the so-called petroleum age will be over.
VLAD. And what does the world do then? Run on nuclear energy? Geothermal? Solar? Hydroelectric?
MARIYA. Geothermal and current solar energy are not sufficient to replace the vast quantity of energy that is available from fossil fuels. It would be necessary to use nuclear energy.
By the way, hydroelectric energy is a form of current solar energy. Current solar energy is all energy available from the solar radiation impinging on the planet. It includes all renewable forms of energy, that is, energy other than geothermal or tides. It includes hydroelectric, biomass, wind, solar thermal and solar electric, or photovoltaic.
Nuclear energy is not a perfect replacement for oil. Compared to nuclear energy, oil is easy to extract. It is easily transportable and safe. Nuclear energy is used mainly to generate electricity in fixed plants. Nuclear energy is a costly, high-technology energy source. When accidents happen, as history shows they do, it becomes extremely expensive. Because of the high cost and technical complexity, it is used much less for mobile applications, such as nuclear-powered submarines. For mobile applications, it is used mainly for large or unmanned vehicles, since shielding personnel from radiation requires a lot of weight.
Breeder reactors produce more fissile material than they consume, so the long-term supply is not an issue.
VLAD. So, when the petroleum age ends, industrial civilization will simply switch to nuclear power?
MARIYA. The direct answer to your question is yes, but it’s not that simple. The real problem is not in the supply of energy. It is the fact that the planet can handle just so much of it.
VLAD. What do you mean?
MARIYA. What I mean is that energy use generates waste, and most industrial processes do not address the issue of waste. The natural world is in balance – the products of one organism are the food for another. There is in fact no residual waste. All organic products are consumed – the waste from one organism is food for another. With respect to energy and waste, the natural system is in equilibrium. Industrial civilization is not at all in equilibrium. It is using vast amounts of energy beyond that available from current solar, and not reprocessing its waste. The evidence of this is the ever-growing waste landfills. This system is not sustainable.
VLAD. So, if we have, using breeder reactors, a virtually limitless supply of nuclear energy, why don’t we simply use energy to reprocess the waste, such as by burning it?
MARIYA. In fact, we could do this. That would get rid of most of the waste, although that process can be expensive and consumes substantial energy. In any event, there is another problem associated with high energy use. Earth’s biosphere is a closed solar system, and it has evolved to a state of relatively stable equilibrium. The planet’s web of life has evolved to operate on a precise level of solar energy, recycling all of its products, with all species evolving slowly, in a relatively stable equilibrium much of the time. Mass species extinctions have occurred, but they occur very rarely.
Since mankind started to use a lot more energy than is available from the current solar flux, the balance that evolved is upset. From fossil fuels, mankind is now using much more energy than it did before from current solar energy. It has destroyed much natural habitat, replacing other species with human beings and their infrastructure and their garbage. That is the reason for the mass species extinction that is now underway. Most arable land is now put to human uses, and human society make use of a substantial portion of solar energy.
The really significant issue and concern is that we are moving into unknown territory. We evolved in a planet for which the web of life of which we are a part and on which we depend for our existence operated on the current flux of solar energy. We evolved with the rest of the biosphere, and we are a dependent part of it. Previously, the human species represented a very small part of the biosphere and we had little effect on it. We are in the process of causing substantial change to that system, and we do not know the consequences of this change. The biosphere did not evolve to handle large human numbers and industrial production. The results of introducing large changes may be catastrophic, such as significant climate change. A new ice age could cover Russia with glacial ice. As a species, because of large human numbers and industrial production, humankind may be in the process of committing suicide.
VLAD. So, what you are saying is that although mankind has a large amount of energy available even after fossil fuels are no longer used, it may not be prudent to use it?
MARIYA. That is exactly what I am saying. The human species began causing large-scale, irreversible change to the biosphere when large human numbers and industrial production diverted a large portion of solar energy to human uses. We do not know the “tipping point” of the biosphere with respect to waste, natural habitat destruction and species extinction. Industrial production cannot continue indefinitely, but we don’t know the point at which some sort of biospheric collapse might occur, making the planet unlivable or unpleasant for human beings.
The current situation is analogous to taking control of a car for the first time, and not knowing what the controls do. If you press a button without knowing what it does, you could be in for an unpleasant surprise.
VLAD. OK, I see your point. With these back-and-forth questions and answers, we have probably departed from your planned presentation structure. Have you finished the description of the global picture?
MARIYA. I have finished summarizing the global picture, but some points may have become lost in the discussion, so I will recapitulate. The main point is that large human numbers and industrial production may pose a significant threat to human existence. The amount of energy being consumed for human purposes is affecting the environment in a significant way, degrading it, destroying natural habitat, and crowding out the other species with which we evolved and on which we are dependent.
The second point is that today’s large human numbers and industrial production require a lot of energy – substantially more than is available through natural processes from current solar energy. Relying only on current solar energy, without supplementation by fossil fuels or nuclear energy, human population and industrial production levels would be much less than at present.
The third point is that the additional energy, beyond that available from current solar, may be provided either by fossil fuels or nuclear energy, and the energy loss associated with the end of fossil fuels can be replaced by nuclear energy.
Fossil fuels offer significant advantages over nuclear – they are cheaper, safer and transportable. For these reasons, human society may ignore the climate-change effects and continue to use them until commercially recoverable reserves are exhausted. At current rates of consumption, fossil fuels will deplete in a century or two – the exact date is uncertain, but it is not far off. At current export rates, Russia will deplete sooner than that. We would outlast the world in fossil fuels if we used them just for the Russian population and in support of production of finished products for export, but not if we continue to export raw petroleum, natural gas and coal at high levels. Under our current policy, we are selling the farm. At current rates of consumption, fossil fuels will exhaust within a couple of centuries, and human civilization will turn to nuclear power to supplement current solar energy.
VLAD. So, in summary, high energy use by human society – substantially above the levels reasonably available from current solar energy – may threaten our existence as a species – or, at the very least, make the biosphere a much less diverse, interesting and pleasant environment. As fossil fuels deplete, nuclear energy will enable the continuation of large human population and industrial production. Some countries may lose population, as they have from people fleeing war, violence and climate-change-related environmental problems. But, overall, world population will not reduce. It sounds as if large human numbers and industrial production will continue indefinitely, until some sort of biospheric collapse brings it to a halt. Am I understanding you correctly?
MARIYA. Yes, sir, you are. Even after fossil fuels deplete, energy will be available to continue large human numbers and industrial production as long as the biosphere can accommodate it. Large human numbers and industrial production are, however, making substantial changes to the biosphere in which humankind evolved. If we continue on this path, we may be headed for an ecological catastrophe. The only reasonable course to assuring human survival is to dramatically reduce human numbers and industrial production. Based on history, that will not happen voluntarily.
VLAD. Mariya, please let me interrupt your presentation for a moment. I have noticed that, both in your writeup and in this meeting, that you do not use the term “overpopulation,” which I would have used a number of times. Why is that?
MARIYA. I have no personal objection to the term. In fact, I think that it is quite appropriate. But you are quite right that I have avoided using it. The reason why I don’t use it is that some people argue that there is no such thing. They argue that the world is not at all overpopulated; That the biosphere could support many more people; That the reason for the ills we see associated with large population, such as poverty, hunger, disease, ignorance, lack of adequate housing, lack of meaningful employment, and the like, is with the economic system; That all of these problems are preventable, if society just cared to address them.
That point of view, however, is not my view. I simply don’t wish to waste time in arguments over semantics, and I don’t mind replacing the term “overpopulation” with “large human numbers and industrial production.” As surely as I assert that the world is overpopulated, someone will jump up and assert that this is not true.
It is clear that the system could in fact address the ills that I listed, but in fact it is not intended or designed to do so. The economic system works basically the way those in charge want it to work – it transfers wealth from poor people to rich people. It is designed to generate massive wealth for the planet’s controllers, and to grow, and it accomplishes these functions very well. It is configured to create an uneven distribution of wealth. The wealthy controllers of the planet would have little interest in an economic system that did not make them wealthy.
With respect to the state of the biosphere, however, these distributional characteristics of the economic system are irrelevant. The world is in fact severely overpopulated, not because there are the distributional ills, but because large human numbers and industrial production are causing substantial change to the biosphere. That has nothing to do with the distribution of wealth or of income, or of other economic benefits. The aspect of the economic system that is significant is that it is designed for growth – growth of human population and growth of industrial production. The world’s significant environmental problems are the direct result of large human numbers and industrial production. Unless that issue is addressed, none of these problems is solvable. Unconstrained economic growth has produced large human numbers and industrial output, and these are strangling the planet.
VLAD. OK, Mariya, thank you for that explanation. Your views are very insightful. Please pardon the interruption. Allow me to recapitulate the points that you were making, before I interrupted. Human society will continue to use fossil fuels until they deplete. All Russia can do with respect to that is to slow our export rate so that we run out after the rest of the world. And, if we develop nuclear energy, it doesn’t matter whether we run out of fossil fuels or not. What about natural resources other than fossil fuels?
MARIYA. With respect to forests, as Eric noted, under the current practice of extensive forestry management our commercial forests will be gone within a couple of decades. Extensive forestry management is the practice of clear-cutting without replanting. If we switch to intensive forestry management – replanting when we harvest – we can continue indefinitely at a certain level.
VLAD. Why haven’t we already switched to intensive forestry management?
MARIYA. Evidently it is not a major political concern that all of our commercial forests disappear. Even if we adopt intensive practices, which are costly, we can still export wood products at a significant profit, if we choose to do so. We are destroying our commercial forests simply because extensive forestry management generates greater short-term profits than intensive forestry management, and we don’t care about having commercial forestry in the future.
VLAD. With fossil fuels, we have a hard choice – if we use them, they are gone forever. Perhaps I could state this better: when we use them, they are gone forever. But with forest, we have the option of managing our forests as a sustainable resource, and having them indefinitely. Why don’t we switch?
MARIYA. We certainly can. Shall I state this as an objective for this year’s plan?
VLAD. Unless there are comments from others, let’s do that. [There are no comments.]
MARIYA. OK. Establishing sustainable forestry was a relatively easy issue to address. The difficult issue is fossil fuels. It is recognized by all that we will exhaust fossil fuels. A significant issue for Russia to address is that if we continue to export at current rates we will exhaust those resources before the rest of the world runs out. A second significant issue is that heavy use of fossil fuels has been and continues to be a major factor contributing to destabilization of the biosphere.
VLAD. But nuclear energy can replace fossil fuels. Perhaps not as cheaply, safely or conveniently, but effectively. So, except for cost and convenience, it doesn’t really matter whether we run out of fossil fuels before or after anyone else.
Relative to your second point, in view of the destruction that they are causing to the biosphere, stopping use of fossil fuels would be a good idea.
ERIC. It’s not quite that simple. The government budget is heavily dependent on revenue from fossil-fuel exports. We do export a substantial amount of manufactured products, and we do have substantial revenues from non-export sources, but revenue from fossil-fuel exports represents a major portion of the budget. If the revenue from fossil-fuel export stops or drops a lot, it would have to be replaced by other sources. Such a change requires substantial planning and development.
VLAD. OK, I accept that. How much would we have to restrict fossil-fuel exports to assure that the rest of the world runs out before we do?
MARIYA. Substantially.
VLAD. Eric, if we lost half our government revenue from fossil-fuel exports, how would we replace it?
ERIC. We would have to charge more for other exports, or raise taxes.
VLAD. Are these feasible options?
ERIC. Losing up to about half the revenue from fossil-fuel exports is feasible – it would require some adjustment. Losing more than that would cause a substantial restructuring and readjustment. Fossil fuels represent about 70 percent of total exports. We can’t replace that source of income overnight.
VLAD. The industrialized world is bent on consuming all of the fossil fuels as fast as it can, and there is little that Russia can do about that. Stopping the use of fossil fuels would benefit the biosphere, but the industrialized nations of the world are not about to let that happen. In view of the dependence of the Russian budget on fossil-fuel exports, our stopping use of them is not a realistic option. The best we can do is to moderate their export so that we don’t run out before the rest of the world does. Mariya, can you determine just what the level of fossil-fuel exports should be, so that we don’t run out before others?
MARIYA. I can do that. I can estimate it.
VLAD. Fine. Then let Eric know what is required. Eric, when you get the numbers from Mariya, work out some alternatives for replacing that lost export amount.
ERIC. OK, I’ll do that.
VLAD. Mariya, I have read your draft, and I see no other items I wish to discuss now. Our time is limited, and I don’t want to short-shrift the discussion on defense. Unless you object, let’s wrap things up for now. OK?
MARIYA. We have covered the most important points. Stopping here is OK.
VLAD. OK, good. Thank you, Mariya, that was very informative. Vera? [Vlad turns to Vera, signaling that she proceed with the next speaker.]
VERA. Thank you very much, Mariya. [Mariya leaves the lectern and returns to her seat at the table.] Now, let’s move on to Dimitri’s presentation.
SCENE. The same as before.
VERA. Dimitri, you have the floor. Please tell us about Russian defense.
DIMITRI. Yes, ma’am. [Dimitri moves from his seat at the table to the lectern.] You have an outline of my speaking points in the handout. I will now summarize the key points. First, I shall present a description of the military situation in the world, and Russia’s position in it.
The military situation falls into two categories – nuclear warfare and nonnuclear warfare, the latter which includes conventional warfare, chemical warfare and biological warfare. Nuclear warfare is treated in a class by itself because it has the potential to destroy modern civilization, whereas nonnuclear warfare does not.
The situation with respect to nonnuclear warfare continues to evolve, as weapons technology becomes more advanced. Although nonnuclear war is very significant and continues to be waged year after year around the globe, it remains a manageable undertaking. It is controllable. While it may represent an existential threat to individual nations, it is not an existential threat to human civilization. In today’s presentation I propose to focus on nuclear warfare, for several reasons.
First is its importance – its potential to destroy modern civilization. Second is the assessment that the risk of nuclear war has increased substantially in recent years, for a number of reasons, which I will discuss later. Third is the development, by Russia, of a nuclear-powered cruise missile. This development is a “game changer.” It has destabilized the status quo. It has increased the likelihood of nuclear war, raised the expected amount of damage that would result from a nuclear war and, for a brief time – until other countries develop the same capability – the likelihood that Russia would prevail in a large-scale nuclear war.
So, for the preceding reasons, in today’s meeting I propose to restrict discussion to nuclear war.
VLAD. OK, I agree. Let’s focus on nuclear war, at least for today. We may want to discuss nonnuclear war in a later session. It is certainly important. Up to now, we have never engaged in nuclear war.
Let me ask for clarification on a point you made. How has Russia’s development of the nuclear-powered cruise missile increased the chance of nuclear war? It could in fact be viewed as a deterrent.
DIMITRI. Because if nuclear war occurs while we possess this advantage, there is an increased chance that we would win. To offset this advantage, there is an incentive for other nations to strike first.
VLAD. All right, that makes sense. Please continue.
DIMITRI. Fine. The first thing that I will discuss is the nature of the threat of nuclear war. I am speaking here of large-scale nuclear war, involving the destruction of a substantial portion of the planet’s human population and industrial capacity.
VLAD. I understand that there are two basic types of nuclear attack, counterforce and countervalue. Counterforce attacks military installations and military assets, such as military bases, missile silos and nuclear submarines. Countervalue attacks targets of intrinsic value, such as industrial capacity, energy sources, infrastructure and population. Are you restricting discussion to a particular type of attack?
DIMITRI. No, not at all. The nature of a nuclear war, including both offense and defense, will be determined in the course of the war situation, as it evolves. It is not restricted to a particular type of attack or defense. Our strategic and tactical plans, policies, procedures and decisions take into account the full spectrum of goals and interests, and the full range of attack and defense types.
Large-scale nuclear war is an undertaking that may be played only once. To achieve the best possible outcome for Russia, that single play should not be restricted without justification. I will be addressing the full range of considerations, including Russia’s goals, objectives, decision criteria, strategies and tactics, as well as those of the opponents.
VLAD. OK, I didn’t intend to interrupt the structure or sequence of your presentation. Go ahead. By the way, in this meeting, just because I ask a question does not mean that I do not already know the answer. I may ask a question simply so that the others here will consider and comment on it.
DIMITRI. OK. I understand. First, I will discuss the nature of the threat posed by nuclear war. As I mentioned, I am speaking here of large-scale nuclear war. Large-scale nuclear war poses a threat to the existence of modern civilization in several ways. First, modern civilization is fragile. It is a highly complex system with many interacting and interdependent components. Its continued operation requires timely input of a lot of material inputs, labor and energy. A large-scale nuclear war will destroy many parts of the system and could lead to a complete collapse. This could occur, for example, if all large cities were destroyed, or if most large energy sources, such as oil fields, coal fields or hydroelectric dams, were destroyed.
Nuclear war destroys infrastructure, population and natural resources, including energy sources. The primary way in which nuclear war causes damage is from the direct effects of blast and heat. In addition to physical damage caused by the direct effects of blast and heat, there are two other major areas in which nuclear war inflicts damage – radioactive fallout and nuclear winter. I will now discuss each of these.
The second major threat from nuclear warfare is radioactive fallout. Radioactive fallout is the settling of radioactive dust from a nuclear blast. Much of the fallout settles downwind of the blast in a large plume, but some is distributed over large areas, including the entire world. Radioactive fallout causes sickness and death, depending on the intensity and duration of the radiation dose.
The nuclear radiation from fallout decreases over time, as the nuclear products decay. It is important to seek shelter in fallout shelters for a few weeks or months, until the radiation falls to low levels. Rain can wash away much of the fallout. Other decontamination measures can help. The essential thing is to have a large supply of well-shielded fallout shelters, adequately ventilated and stocked with water and food, to reduce casualties from fallout. Russia has a large number of fallout shelters that are ventilated and stocked with food, water, medicines and other essential supplies. Our population is well protected from the threat of fallout. Switzerland also has a substantial fallout-shelter capacity. So does Finland. Most other countries, including the United States, do not.
Note that radioactive fallout will be heavier in the northern hemisphere than in the southern hemisphere. This is because there are more targets in the northern hemisphere, and hence more nuclear-weapon detonations, and, because of global wind patterns, debris from explosions tends to remain for a time in the polar hemisphere into which it was injected.
The third major threat of large-scale nuclear warfare is nuclear winter. When large amounts of dust are injected into the atmosphere, such as in a large volcanic eruption, asteroid collision, or large-scale nuclear war, the dust reduces the amount of sunshine reaching the surface. Substantial amounts of dust can cause intense cooling, within a day, sufficient to destroy much plant and animal life. Lesser amounts of dust can reduce the crop yields for several years, until the dust finally settles. Long-term cooling effects such as these are called “nuclear winter.”
The likelihood of nuclear winter depends on how many nuclear bombs are detonated, and whether they are surface bursts or air bursts. For many years, it was believed that the threat of nuclear winter from a large-scale nuclear war was substantial. It is now generally believed that the amount of dust injected into the atmosphere by a large-scale nuclear war would not be sufficient to cause a severe nuclear winter. Harvest yields could be seriously affected for a year or two, and crops could be rendered dangerous from radiation. If fallout shelters are stocked with sufficient supplies to last one or two years, this threat can be substantially mitigated.
In summary, the major immediate threat from large-scale nuclear war is direct-effect damage. It should be recognized that the amount of damage sufficient to cause the collapse of industrialized society is not high. Analysis has shown that the destruction of a minor portion of population and industry is sufficient to cause a collapse, because of disruption of supply chains. A relatively small number of bombs can destroy a substantial portion of energy resources, such as oil and coal fields, or hydroelectric dams. Without large-scale sources of energy, modern industrial society collapses quickly.
VLAD. OK, so large-scale nuclear war poses an existential threat. To all mankind? To Russia?
DIMITRI. Russia has always maintained that nuclear war at anticipated levels is survivable, given sufficient planning and preparation. That is still our position. It appears that no other large country has made preparations sufficient to last through one or two growing seasons. Some island nations would survive even without preparation, since fallout will be low in places such as these that are far from targets and since it is believed that the level of nuclear winter from nuclear war would be insufficient to destroy the marine life on which they depend.
So, large-scale nuclear war is an existential threat to large-scale modern civilization, but the severity of that threat can be mitigated. If the attack were not too large, technological civilization could continue in any place where preparations were made to protect the population from fallout and a lost growing season, and where industrial-capacity energy source was available, such as nuclear, hydroelectric or fossil fuel. Russia has made these preparations.
VLAD. But you qualified your assessment with the phrase “if the attack were not too large.” How large is too large? If the Americans hit us with all 6,500 of their warheads, would we survive?
DMITRI. All 6,500? No, there are only 1,110 cities and towns in all of Russia. That would be a warhead on every city and town, with plenty to spare. Nothing would remain.
VLAD. So you’re saying we’re doomed?
DIMITRI. No, not at all. I was answering the question you asked, but the situation you described, of the US firing 6,500 missiles at Russia, is not going to happen. First, only 1,600 of their warheads are strategic, located on long-range missiles, submarines or bombers. Second, we possess a large inventory of missile interceptors. Third, Russia is not the only target of the United States. Fourth, the US is not going to fire all of its missiles at once. In a realistic war, at current global inventory levels of nuclear weapons, a significant Russian capacity would survive the initial attack.
VLAD. OK, OK. I am getting ahead. Pardon my question. Please continue.
DIMITRI. OK, I have covered a description of the existential threat that large-scale nuclear war poses to Russia and the world. I will now describe the likelihood that large-scale nuclear war occurs.
The main factor driving the likelihood of a large-scale nuclear war is the fact that the world’s nuclear stockpile, or inventory, is very large. Despite decades of efforts to reduce the level of nuclear weaponry in the world, the world’s nuclear stockpiles remain high – about 14,000 weapons in all. Russia and the US each possess about 6,500 warheads, and seven other countries possess about 1,000. It is in Russia’s interest to have the total number substantially reduced. We have a high likelihood of surviving a small nuclear war, but the probability of survival decreases as the size of the global stockpile increases.
The risk of nuclear war, of whatever size, is increasing, for a number of reasons. These include the following:
1. the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
2. the miniaturization of nuclear weapons;
3. the advancement of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
4. the increasing complexity of modern weapon systems;
5. the increasing threat of cyber warfare;
6. the increasing availability of nuclear defense systems; these systems work in small attacks, but would be overwhelmed in large attacks; their performance in small attacks may be contributing to a false sense of security;
7. the promotion of the use of nuclear warfare as an instrument of religion;
8. the growing abilities of rogue-state and non-state actors;
9. increased discussion of nuclear war;
10. the growing perception that nuclear war may be survivable, even winnable, and that civilization may rebuild after its occurrence;
11. the growing acceptance that the likelihood of it is increasing, may in fact be high, and, barring a substantial change in human affairs, may be inevitable;
12. the growing view that the current world economic system is not good, either for mankind or for the rest of the biosphere, and should be replaced;
13. the increasing unhappiness stress in the world war as human population and industrial activity remains at levels, continuing to degrade the environment, increase crowding, and support the continuation of low quality of life and misery for a very large number of people.
These factors increase the likelihood of intentional war and of accidental war. They also affect the size and scope of the war. They introduce substantial uncertainty into the chance that war will occur, into the expected damage caused by nuclear warfare, and into the expected outcome. The likelihood of a large-scale nuclear war has increased because of the possibility that a small attack could be mistaken for a large one, and thereby lead to a large counterattack.
It should be noted that many of the factors that I have listed are changing over time to further increase the likelihood of large-scale nuclear war. Nuclear proliferation is increasing. Human population, crowding and misery are increasing. The increasing complexity of military systems cannot reduce the likelihood of an accident to zero. The likelihood of a small incident, which could lead to a large one, is increasing.
VLAD. I was particularly taken by one of the points that you made, that simply talking about nuclear war makes it more likely to happen. It renders it more familiar and more conceivable. It desensitizes strong feelings about it. In a sense, it legitimizes it.
In any event, in view of all of these factors, from what you are saying, it appears that nuclear war is likely to happen.
DIMITRI. In any given year, a small chance exists. If the situation does not change, however, the probability of occurrence over a long period of time becomes high. It is very reasonable to assume that a nuclear war of some size will eventually occur – it happened once, and it could happen again – and it is prudent to assume that a large-scale nuclear war may occur. That is why we are preparing for it.
VLAD. OK, you have summarized the situation and the risk. What are those preparations?
DMITRI. Yes, I have covered the main features of large-scale nuclear war, and the risk that it will occur. I will now discuss our strategy for preparing for it and our tactics for waging it. I will divide the discussion into four parts. The first part discusses goals and decision criteria. The second part addresses strategy for preparing for nuclear war. The third part addresses tactics for waging it, and the fourth part addresses an approach to dealing with the aftermath.
VLAD. That sounds logical.
SCENE. The same as before.
VLAD. OK, Dimitri, tell us about preparations for nuclear war.
DIMITRI. The foundation for all Russian military activity is the set of goals that it seeks to achieve by military force. As Carl von Clausewitz asserted, war is simply the accomplishment of political goals by other means. For this reason, the goals that I am about to state are simply Russian goals in general, when peaceful political means become inoperative, such as if we are attacked by a foreign power.
In discussing the economy and natural resources, Eric and Mariya described goals in the context of the current world political environment, in which Russia is one of a couple of hundred nations, and conventional war continues at a low level. This type of war does not end civilization. It damages things and reorders things, but after the war reconstruction occurs and it is business as usual again.
For nuclear war, this context is destroyed. The situation is not at all the same. It is an entirely new ball game. In this new context, the goals are different.
In the world following a large-scale nuclear, society as we know it will have been largely destroyed. The opportunity will exist to establish a new world order. The present world order has many flaws and shortcomings. It is not working well for the biosphere, or for mankind’s long-term survival, or even to promote the general welfare and happiness of the people. Our view is that out of the ruins of nuclear war a better system of planetary management that overcomes the shortcomings of the present system might be established.
To this end, the following are the goals of the Russian military establishment, relative to large-scale nuclear war:
1. Prevent the extinction of the human race.
2. Stop the large-scale destruction of the biosphere, and preserve it as we know it.
3. Preserve mankind’s knowledge of technology.
4. Preserve Russia: its people, culture and values.
5. Establish a long-term-sustainable system of planetary management.
VLAD. These goals are “pie in the sky.” Why aren’t they simpler, such as “minimize destruction to Russia” or “assure that Russia is victorious”?
DIMITRI. Simpler goals such as those you mentioned are relative to conventional military combat, in which the level of destruction is manageable and the world context remains the same. If global nuclear war occurs, the present context will be gone. The new situation represents a tabula rasa on which we can build a new world, as we wish it to be.
VLAD. The government serves the Russian people. Why isn’t goal four, the preservation of Russia, goal one?
DIMITRI. Goal four – that Russia prevail – is the primary goal of conventional warfare, or even of small-scale tactical nuclear warfare, but not of large-scale nuclear warfare. These goals, and their prioritization, have been hammered out through endless discussions and meetings. Russia is always evolving. All countries and cultures are always evolving. The biosphere and the human race may last for millions of years. It is unrealistic and in fact arrogant to believe that Russia or any nation will last that long. If global nuclear war happens, our goals are to preserve the essential aspects of life on Earth – the biosphere and intelligent life.
VLAD. In line with that reasoning, why doesn’t the goal to establish a long-term-survivable planetary management system precede the goal of preserving Russia?
In fact, if the primary goal is to prevent the extinction of mankind, then it does not matter what nation survives. All that matters is that there are some survivors. It doesn’t matter who they are. Why, then, did you list as a goal the survival of Russia?
DIMITRI. To save the biosphere from further damage and to keep the human species from becoming extinct, it is crucially important to set up a long-term-sustainable system of planetary management. No other country or culture is serious about establishing a long-term-sustainable planetary management system. No community of nations can do it. Only Russia chooses to do this. If Russia does not prevail in a large-scale nuclear war, this will not be accomplished, and the biosphere as we know it, and mankind, will be doomed. In our view, it is an “if and only if” situation – Russia’s sole survival is a necessary and sufficient condition for the survival of the biosphere. If Russia prevails, it will be achieved; if Russia does not prevail, it will not be achieved.
VLAD. If, as you say, Russia will not last forever, because no nation ever does, why does it matter whether we preserve Russia? Once Russia is gone, whatever planetary management system it has set up will die with it. Whether Russia survives a global nuclear war will make no difference in the long run. So why does Russia’s survival matter?
DIMITRI. If Russia prevails in global nuclear war, it will target large fossil-fuel reserves. It will destroy many of them and will prevent use of the remaining reserves. It is fossil fuels that are the main factor contributing to change in the biosphere. Russia will have permanently stopped the use of fossil fuels – no other nation will do this. Even if Russia does not endure for a long time, it will have accomplished this one very important step in stopping further destruction to the biosphere, and that step cannot be undone. So, with due respect, contrary to your assertion, Russia’s conduct of global war and its aftermath will make a difference in the long run.
It has been estimated that industrial civilization has consumed about half of all fossil-fuel reserves. In view of the tremendous negative effects that consuming just half of the fossil fuels has had, it is reasonable to view that consuming the remaining half will cause inestimable damage.
If the biosphere is to be saved, it is crucially important that Russia prevail over all other nations. If any other nation prevails, it will work to rebuild the global economic system, and the biosphere may be doomed. Unless Russia is dominant, a long-term-sustainable planetary management system will not be set up, because no other nation wants it. Moreover, the use of fossil fuels will not end, because no other nation wants that, either. In that case, the biosphere faces continued massive change. In a large-scale nuclear war, it is crucially important for the planet that Russia be the sole surviving nation. All other nations are committed to growth-based economic systems, which lead eventually to a ruined biosphere.
VLAD. Dimitri, despite your thorough explanation, I still have a problem with the ranking of your goals. You make it sound as if Russia’s goal is to save the biosphere, out of some lofty sense of culture or moral purpose. The basic goal of any government is self-preservation. Russia’s basic goal is to save Russia. In my view, saving Russia is the primary goal, and saving the biosphere is a secondary goal. Saving the biosphere is a side-effect, not a necessary prerequisite to saving Russia.
Moreover, in my view there is not a lot that Russia can do to save the biosphere. The biosphere contains and controls us; we do not control it. The biosphere can take care of itself. The current human population explosion is, in fact, no different from an algae bloom in a pond – population explosions are not sustainable, and quickly pass.
DIMITRI. Yes, that is true, but an algal bloom may kill all the fish in the pond.
VLAD. OK, that’s a good point. Perhaps my example was a little extreme.
I have a more substantial reason for questioning the rankings. If you place the goal of saving the biosphere above that of saving Russia, then you justify the use of global nuclear war to stop the environmental destruction of the biosphere and the human-caused mass species extinction. That position is not defensible, from a political perspective. Ranking Russia’s survival lower than any other goal is not credible. The instinct to survive is very strong. The instinct for altruism is not. Countries will not hesitate to destroy other countries to save themselves, but they will not do it to save the world. To many people, the thought of using nuclear war to save the biosphere is a morally unacceptable choice – they would rather do nothing and see the entire human race destroy the biosphere and starve to death naturally, than make a deliberate choice to use war as an instrument of population control. The sin of omission is easier to live with than the sin of commission.
DIMITRI. War has always been used as a means of population control. When human population exceeds resource limits, nations go to war. That is basic survival, or basic economics – morality has nothing to do with it.
VLAD. Apart from saving the biosphere, you also make it sound as if it is Russia’s goal to save humanity from extinction, or at least, to save human civilization from extinction. One might question whether the human species or modern civilization are worth saving, given the massive amount of misery they promote, and their propensity for destroying their own nest. In any event, Russians will sacrifice to save Russia, but not to save the world.
DIMITRI. You have a point. I must assert, however, that from a logical viewpoint you cannot save Russia – at least, for the long term – unless you save the biosphere. Saving the biosphere has to be the main goal. If the biosphere is not saved, then Russia eventually perishes, even if it wins the war.
VLAD. OK, I grant that your arguments are logically persuasive, if not politically so. I don’t want to get mired in details. I agree that your list of goals is worthwhile, even if I have a question about their ranking. I agree that if Russia prevails it can and will make a significant difference. Your argument hinges in part, however, on the premise that no other country is committed to setting up a long-term-sustainable planetary management system. That they are all committed to growth-based economics. Are you sure of this? What about China, for example? As we have done, they too may simply be using free-market economics as a tool to achieve a particular short-term goal, and once that goal has been accomplished will abandon it.
DIMITRI. All we have are their national plans and our intelligence related to them. From what we know, all of them are committed to economic growth and increased material lifestyles for their citizens, regardless of the harm that this causes to the biosphere. They may pay lip service to protecting the environment, but their actions reveal this to be a complete sham. If they have their way, economic activity, population and industrial production will not only continue at high levels, but will grow. Some may have eschewed growth-based economics at one time, but, once adopted, no country ever abandons it. It is addictive. Today’s world leaders do not view growth-based economics as the means to an end, but as the end itself.
When I refer to a planetary management system, it is a long-term-sustainable planetary management system in which the biosphere is relatively stable and the human species is living in harmony with the other species in it. Many nations would be delighted to set up and operate a planetary management system, but their concept would have nothing to do with the biosphere or human extinction. If the US were to operate a planetary management system, for example, it would be in support of economic development, growth-based economics, large human numbers and industrial production, and globalization.
VLAD. How has Russia managed to avoid this fate, of becoming addicted to economic activity and growth? In fact, have we?
DIMITRI. Economic growth and population growth per se have never been that important to Russia. The reason is that Russian culture has higher values than a fixation on economic growth. Russia has a sense of destiny. Political power and sovereignty are important. Wealth and comfort are important, but growth per se is not. Growth in support of an objective can be important as a tool for accomplishing other goals, but it is not a goal in and of itself. The answer to your first question is no.
For your second question, of whether we have become addicted, the answer is also no. From our discussion of goals, it is clear that growth – either economic growth or population growth – is not a primary goal. Growth may be a short-term component of a plan, but it is not a long-term goal in and of itself.
VLAD. Why doesn’t the US have a similar long-term vision for the planet?
DIMITRI. It’s not clear. Perhaps it is the culture of fixating on the near term. Perhaps they don’t see long-term survival as feasible. Perhaps they have given up.
For a long time, the US considered large-scale nuclear war unwinnable. That is one reason why they abandoned their civil defense system. In a letter to President John Kennedy, John Kenneth Galbraith, one of America’s foremost economists, made the following comment about the impracticability of civil defense in nuclear war: “Those Americans who did manage to survive a nuclear exchange would emerge into a desolate world with no food, no transportation, and full of stinking corpses.” Kennedy had initially supported the idea of fallout shelters, but then, seeing little political support for them, he basically dropped the idea. Some studies were conducted to assess the extent to which basements of large buildings might be used as fallout shelters, and some in fact were stocked with water, but the program eventually died.
An effective fallout shelter program would have cost a lot. As alternatives, Kennedy suggested sending a man to the moon, and invading Vietnam. Those ventures, along with President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society and War on Poverty, consumed much of America’s wealth in the 1960s and 1970s. The Great Society and going to the moon were flashy, Hollywood. Fallout shelters were a bore, and focused attention on a hypothetical war that America believed it could not win. America preferred to spend its wealth on exciting adventures rather than civil defense.
VLAD. You mentioned John Kenneth Galbraith. At university, I read some of his work. You said that he was an American. I thought that he was British.
DIMITRI. No, in fact, he was born a British Subject, a Canadian. I happen to know a little about him. He was born in Iona Station, Ontario, Canada, in 1908, of Scottish descent. His birthplace was nothing more than a railway station. He earned a PhD in economics from the University of California at Berkeley. He became a US citizen in 1937, while he was teaching at Harvard. He studied for a while at the University of Cambridge, England, where he was influenced by John Maynard Keynes. Galbraith was a giant – six feet nine inches, or 206 centimeters.
VLAD. Hmm, that’s interesting. So Galbraith was a key factor in the US decision not to have fallout shelters? The very policy that may enable Russia to prevail in nuclear war?
DIMITRI. Well, he was not the only factor, but certainly a factor. Kennedy listened to him.
VLAD. Well, thank you, Professor Galbraith, for your contribution to the cause.
We’re getting a little off track here. We were discussing reasons why the US does not have the same vision as we do for a post-nuclear-war world. You had mentioned a couple of reasons, such as their view that nuclear war was not winnable.
DIMITRI. Yes, that view – that nuclear war is unwinnable – was a key factor in underlying their promotion of the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction. With that mindset, however, they are in fact defeated before they even start. They are not interested in dealing with a post-nuclear-war environment. It does not suit them. It is not a game they want to play. They have no stomach for it. Evidently, they would rather be dead than have to deal with it. If they cannot have their comfortable wealth, they prefer to have nothing at all. Their world vision ends with global nuclear war. They have no vision of a post-nuclear-war world or of a long-term-sustainable biosphere. With respect to global nuclear war, they appear to be in a state of denial. They don’t want to think about it, they have no goals relative to it, and they have made no plans or preparations for dealing with it. We do.
Although we wish to avoid global nuclear war, if it happens we will make the most of the situation. If it occurs, we intend to prevail. We would view it as a tremendous opportunity to save the planet and mankind, to remake the planetary management system from a completely dysfunctional, crowded, biosphere-destroying one in which billions of people are living in poverty, deprivation, degradation, hopelessness and misery to a resource-laden, low-population one that promotes human dignity, meaning, purpose and happiness, and provides tremendous opportunities for personal growth, adventure and accomplishment for most people. Our people and its government leaders are psychologically prepared for this challenge. We have prepared and trained for this opportunity. If this challenge arises, we will meet it, and we will prevail. We would not view a post-nuclear-war apocalyptic world as the end of civilization, but as an incredible opportunity to replace a highly dysfunctional system with a much better one, the second time around.
VLAD. OK, I accept that. You list preserving Russian people and culture, but you do not list preserving Russian infrastructure. Was that intentional?
DIMITRI. In large-scale nuclear war, we cannot guarantee the survival of much infrastructure, or of a large portion of the population. All that we can really do is increase the likelihood that a substantial portion of the Russian genetic pool survives, and that it possesses the will, skills and resources to carry on. When I use the word preserve, I am referring to the survival of a viable core element. In global nuclear war, there is no way that we can assure the survival of a major portion of population or infrastructure. Furthermore, we cannot assure the survival of particular individuals or locations. All we can do is play the odds, and work toward increasing the likelihood that a residual functional capability survives, somewhere.
It is not our goal to attempt to save a maximal amount of Russian population or infrastructure – that is the type of approach that the United States is taking for itself. Our goal is to assure the survival of a core Russian population and infrastructure, so that we can prevail and continue, and set up a responsible planetary management system. This core will be the seed of a new planetary civilization. No single individual ever survives, with or without nuclear war. All that we can do is assure the survival of our culture, race or species, not of specific individuals. That is our goal. And it does not require a very large surviving population to implement it.
VLAD. OK, the goals and their ordering are clear and reasonable. I accept the validity of your arguments, at least for now. The discussion has been enlightening. If no one has questions or comments, let’s move on to strategy. [There are no comments.]
DIMITRI. Fine. I will now address strategy for preparing for nuclear war. Very simply, a strategy is a plan for allocating weapons to the enemy’s targets and interceptors to friendly targets, in a way that satisfies certain criteria. A strategy is a master plan for allocating military assets prior to war. It is developed well in advance of war. Strategy is in contrast to tactics, which are policies and procedures for employing military assets during battle.
A strategy is based on criteria that measure the desirability of the outcome of the war. A good strategy is one that achieves desirable outcomes. In a simple context, there might be a single criterion of minimizing damage to a country’s cities. There is a large branch of mathematics concerned with solving this type of problem. It is the mathematics of optimization, decision theory and game theory. The science of game theory is substantial. It ranges from simple zero-sum games to complex nonzero-sum games.
A mathematical game is a model of reality in which there are players having competing interests. It is fundamentally different from a one-sided statistical decision problem, in which there is no adversary, or just relatively ineffective ones.
Nuclear warfare is not a zero-sum game. It is not at all the case that damage to one side represents a benefit to the other. Each player in the conflict has its own interests in terms of causing damage to the enemy, mitigating damage to itself, and achieving desired outcomes. In technical terms, the problem is formulated as a general-sum mathematical game, and a solution is found that satisfies a number of criteria relating to the goals of each side. There are a variety of solutions, depending on the players’ goals and the solution criteria that are used.
One approach is to determine a “bargaining” solution that is agreeable to both sides. The solution that is preferable to both parties may avoid combat altogether. A mathematical structure for implementing this approach was developed by the mathematician John Nash. That approach was used initially, when there were only two major sides in the game – the US and USSR. The strategy that was developed was called Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD. Under that strategy, both sides were deterred from initiating a nuclear war in the knowledge that the enemy’s strength was sufficient to destroy them. That strategy was evidently successful in deterring both sides from waging nuclear war, for many decades.
The nature of the problem – that is, the problem of how to deal with nuclear warfare – changed over time. The MAD strategy is reasonable when there are two opponents in a conflict and they have similar military strength, assets and values. In today’s world, there are now a number of combatants – all the groups that possess nuclear weapons – and their motivations, interests, strengths, assets and values vary to a great degree. A difficulty that arises immediately in this situation is that it may not be evident where an attack is coming from. If you are attacked by a single suitcase bomb from an unknown source, whom do you retaliate against? And at what level? You see the problem.
Another difficulty with MAD is that it must be clear to both sides that they will in fact suffer an unacceptable level of damage, in the event of war. A problem that always existed with MAD is that the US believed that large-scale nuclear war was unwinnable, but the Soviet Union believed that it was survivable. A reflection of the US view that nuclear war was unwinnable was their decision, in the 1970s, to discontinue their fallout shelter program. When missile defense interceptors were developed, however, the US evidently reconsidered its view, and accepted that certain levels of nuclear war are survivable, perhaps even winnable.
In any event, for several reasons, the situation evolved so that MAD was no longer a reasonable strategy. As the situation changed, it became necessary to investigate alternative strategies. Although MAD is no longer a reasonable solution to the problem, the same basic methodology is applied – mathematical game theory – to find a good strategy. The problem is very complicated, and there is no closed-form solution to it. Solutions are found by computer simulation. A very large number of scenarios, or situations, are constructed, and war is simulated using a broad spectrum of strategies and tactics, in those scenarios. The scenarios are generated by computer simulation, by statistically sampling from probability distributions that take into account all that we know about the combatants’ offensive and defensive strengths, goals, weapon and interceptor characteristics, and values.
The tools at our disposal are not just mathematics and computer simulation. Every result obtained by mathematical analysis and computer simulation is subjected to intensive evaluation by human war gaming. The mathematics is a useful guide to good solutions, but we rely on wisdom and judgment to assess the theoretical results.
Implementing this methodology – both the theoretical aspects and the human-based evaluation – requires substantial time and effort. First, it is necessary to be diligent about identifying and developing offensive and defensive weapons that can provide a military advantage. Second, it is necessary to collect as much information as possible on the enemies’ characteristics – their offensive and defensive weapon inventories, their characteristics such as capabilities and locations, their objectives and values, and their decision criteria. The information that each side has about the situation will differ, and the better the information, the greater the chance that it will achieve its objectives.
I should note that it may be of advantage to share information. For example, the MAD strategy would not work if one side had no information about the capabilities of the other. To be significant, a threat has to be known, credible and substantial. In constructing a bargaining solution, the involved sides must be aware of basic opponent characteristics and capabilities.
VLAD. How far does this go? Should the enemy know the location of our weapons and interceptors, for example?
DIMITRI. Not all information is shared. The enemy may know and probably does know, from satellite imagery, the locations of major weapons and interceptors, except perhaps for our submarines. He does not know, however, the doctrine for employing them. Nuclear warfare makes use of randomized strategies. The opponent does not know how we will allocate our weapons to his targets, and he does not know which of our targets will be defended by area interceptors. The information set that is shared with other players is optimized to increase the likelihood that Russia achieves its goals. It goes without saying that this information-sharing process might include disinformation, if that is in our interest.
What I have been describing so far is strategic considerations – the development and deployment of offensive forces and systems, defensive forces and systems, general support systems such as communications, and defensive measures such as hardening of targets, dispersal of population and industry, and the location, sizing and stocking of defense shelters. I will now turn to consideration of tactics.
SCENE. The same as before.
DIMITRI. [Shuffles his papers, takes a sip of water.] OK, I will now discuss tactics. As I mentioned earlier, tactics are policies and procedures for conducting nuclear warfare, once it is initiated. The development of tactics is based on the same mathematical theories as was the development of strategy. All that differs is the time frame – strategy is long-term, and tactics are short-term.
VLAD. Does tactics include the decision to strike first?
DIMITRI. Yes, that is a tactical decision, both in terms of the size, distribution and timing of the strike. The decision to strike depends on the situation, which is always evolving. In general, our policy is not to attack unless first attacked, and to respond in a measured, proportionate way. As is obvious from Eric’s presentation, Russia is now a highly developed industrial nation, with substantial physical and intellectual assets. We have much to lose. A nuclear war could cause much destruction and change our relative position in the world from a superpower to a destroyed country. As a general policy, nuclear war is to be assiduously avoided. We must accept the possibility that it may occur, however, and prepare for it. By “preparing for it” I mean that Russia will not only survive, but will prevail.
VERA. But we could be the first to use nuclear weapons, right?
DIMITRI. Of course. That goes without saying. In World War II, the United States used a first strike against Japan, even though the US had already won the war. Some of our adversaries are known to be planning a first strike against us, as soon as the time is right. A preemptive first strike against them or their allies is certainly possible, and could be highly motivated, depending on circumstances. A first strike would be used if not doing so would place us at a substantial disadvantage.
So, any side might contemplate a first strike, but it is highly unlikely that any of the major developed nations would initiate one against each other. As I mentioned, they have too much to lose materially, and a large-scale nuclear war could conceivably cause the extinction of mankind. A first strike would likely come from a disaffected terrorist group with little to lose, or from a theocracy.
A first strike could be made against a rogue nation, if intelligence revealed that it was preparing to strike. If we did this, however, it would be done in coordination with the US and other major players, to avoid the chance that such a strike might be misinterpreted.
In summary, while we could conceivably consider initiating a first strike, it is unlikely that we would do so. It is more likely that a first strike would be initiated by a terrorist group. With one or a small number of weapons. But that could escalate to a large-scale war.
VLAD. OK, so much for first strikes. Let’s move on to other aspects of tactics.
DIMITRI. I want to begin by pointing out that nuclear warfare is what is called a time-sequential game. It is dynamic. One side makes a move, and the other sides respond. Depending on what survives the initial attack, and what information is known about the results of the new situation, there may be a counterattack, and a counterattack to the counterattack, and so on. This is referred to as a “shoot-look-shoot” situation. As the conflict proceeds, some new information may become available. In other cases, the amount of information could decrease, for example, because of electronic countermeasures, cyber warfare, or loss of communications components or systems.
Nuclear war proceeds very quickly. In order to prevail, a nation must have in place tactical systems for making split-second decisions. The situation evolves rapidly, and there is no time for reflection or analysis. From war-game analysis we must already know exactly what our optimal response is to whatever situation develops. Our strategic preparations could take years to complete, but the conduct of nuclear war, at least initially, is measured in minutes and seconds.
Nuclear warfare is highly automated. It uses computers to process information rapidly and artificial intelligence to make good decisions quickly. While a person may be in the loop, it is only for the purpose of making macro-level decisions if time permits. It is a little like piloting a spacecraft – the human pilot does not make detailed calculations or low-level decisions – only big ones. Nuclear war involves thousands of targets, weapons, sensors and events. It involves an incredible amount of information that must be processed in real time, and an infinite array of decisions and actions. Moreover, unlike piloting a spacecraft, the opponents in warfare are actively trying to thwart you and destroy you. Conducting nuclear war effectively is far beyond the capability of human processing abilities.
VLAD. So, what in fact does the commander-in-chief do?
DIMITRI. If there is insufficient time to contact him when an attack occurs or is perceived, the response process is fully automated in accordance with established policy and procedures. If there is time, then he makes policy decisions about the nature of the response to an attack, such as the size of the response and its general nature, such as counterforce or countervalue. Although he has the authority to make detailed decisions about the conduct of the war, it is generally not in Russia’s interest for him to do so.
An optimal response involves the use of randomization, so that an enemy cannot determine our specific actions in advance, even though he may have a lot of information about our physical assets, strategies and tactics. The randomization process takes into account all available information. It is designed to optimize the outcome for Russia. This process is complicated and happens fast. It is implemented by computers. Interfering with or overriding the randomization process would, on average, make things worse, rather than better. Mathematical theory asserts this, and actual war-game experience has demonstrated it to be true.
VLAD. Is what you have described true of the United States, also?
DIMITRI. Yes, it is. Mathematics is mathematics. There is not Russian mathematics and American mathematics. Both sides employ optimal strategies and tactics in accordance with statistical decision theory and game theory. The two sides may possess different assets, values, goals and information sets, but the mathematical theory for deploying and employing those assets to achieve goals of interest is the same.
VLAD. Once an attack is initiated, is it possible to call it back?
DIMITRI. In earlier times, it was. But now, with advanced developments in electronic warfare, cyber warfare, and communications blackouts, that option, although possible in some circumstances, is in general no longer advantageous. There is too great a likelihood of error, and of degrading the intended performance of a system. Nowadays, once a weapon is launched, it is in most cases isolated from external communication. It is like shooting a gun – once the bullet is on its way, it is not called back.
One thing that is important to keep in mind is how fast nuclear war plays out. It involves a large number of split-second decisions. Modern nuclear warfare systems are highly automated. There is often little time available to make a decision, or the situation is overcome by events. Extensive analysis and simulation show that the optimal response is usually the very fast, highly automated one.
VLAD. What if a nuclear missile is fired accidentally? Surely there is a way to deal with this contingency, if it is realized.
DIMITRI. Russia and the US have discussed this contingency at length. The current plan, mutually agreed, is to inform the other side of an accidental firing at once, and attempt to have the other side’s missile interceptors shoot it down.
The success of this resolution of the accident depends on the quality of the interceptors. We both agreed that trying to recall the missiles is not a good approach because of the likelihood of jamming or blackout from EMP, from electromagnetic pulse.
In the event of a mistake, penetration aids such as jamming and decoys are still employed, consistent with the no-call-back policy. If only one or a few missiles is involved, the other side would have a good chance of shooting the missile down. This approach would likely prevent a missile from getting through in the event of one or a few mislaunched missiles, but for a large number, some would likely get through.
VLAD. What do we do then? Under a measured, balanced, proportionate response, do we agree to let them take out a similar number of our assets?
DIMITRI. No, we never agreed to that. It is politically infeasible to do that. No country would agree to the deliberate sacrifice of its citizens or wealth, if it was still in position to defend. What has been agreed is to reimburse losses for accidents economically. The same as with car accident insurance.
VLAD. You seem to have all the answers, and confidence that they are correct, or at least, reasonable. How is this so?
DIMITRI. We have worked on this problem for years, for decades. We have explored an incredible array of alternatives. We have made elaborate physical preparations, both in hardware and software. We have worked hard to increase the accuracy and reliability of our systems to very high levels. We have coordinated with our allies and enemies. We have developed sound strategies and tactics using advanced mathematics, and verified their utility using both computer simulation and physical war games. We have trained.
VLAD. From time to time I see criticism of the use of decision theory and game theory for solving practical problems. How much faith do we have in strategies based on these methods?
DIMITRI. You are correct that these methodologies have been criticized. The criticism is well founded. The psychologists Kahneman and Tversky observed that human beings cannot assess probabilities well, and the statistician Nicholas Taleb observed that we cannot assess the risk of rare events well. Aware of these facts, we invest much effort and care into the assessment of risk and extreme events. A little later, I will discuss our decision criterion, the Minimal Regret criterion. The Minimal Regret criterion attempts to avoid catastrophes. It is designed to handle unusual events, unlike methods that attempt to maximize or minimize expected outcomes. Also, it recognizes the fact that games against nature, or nonadversarial opponents, are fundamentally different from games against intelligent opponents whose goals may be opposed to yours.
While some aspects of our decisions involve averaging over full probability distributions – such as, for example, our use of randomized attacks and defense – in general our tactics are robust against the occurrence of unusual events. That feature is the essence of the Minimal Regret decision criterion – it handles low-likelihood, extreme events well. It can address specific events, not just probability distributions of events. It is a risk-averse approach. Given the possibility of catastrophic outcomes from global war, this approach is considered appropriate.
In summary, we have invested great effort in trying to assure that our approach to preparing for and waging nuclear war will end well for Russia, mankind, and the biosphere. We have worked equally hard to reduce the likelihood that nuclear war will happen. That is why we discuss our goals and strategies with our allies and adversaries – to show them how well prepared we are, and thereby help them avoid making a terrible mistake.
VLAD. OK, Dimitri, that was a very thorough discussion of tactics. Thank you.
SCENE. The same as before.
VLAD. Dimitri has given us a good overview of tactics. It would appear that if we have a good assessment of a situation we will be able to respond appropriately. One thing that concerns me, however, is the possibility of a loss in communications, so that we lose track of what the situation is. This could happen, for example, if an enemy managed to take out our navigation satellite system or other communications links. I realize that our systems are incredibly capable, but their effective use depends in large measure on having a good assessment of the situation, and this in turn depends on having good communications. What if there is a large-scale blackout, and we lose communications?
DIMITRI. To answer that question well I need to provide some background information about the role of communications in military systems.
When launching a missile, it is necessary to know its position and orientation. This information is known for all fixed weapons, such as missiles in silos. For moving assets, such as submarines, planes, trains, and other launch vehicles, this information is available from our global satellite communication system, GLONASS. The Americans have their own such system, a military version of the Global Positioning System, or GPS.
Once a missile is launched, it usually longer relies on satellite communications for location and velocity information. It may use satellite data, but it does not depend on it. After launch, a missile’s flight may be guided or unguided. If unguided, the missile simply flies to where it was aimed, without any in-flight adjustments. If guided, there are two main types of guidance systems. One is an inertial guidance system, which does not require external inputs. It relies on on-board sensors such as gyroscopes and accelerometers. For the other category, such as a cruise missile, laser-guided bomb, or heat-seeking missile, adjustments may be made to the course throughout its flight, based on external information. Large missiles may use active sensor systems such as radar, sonar, or other electromagnetic sensors, and internal maps, to determine location and velocity. Smaller missiles, such as heat-seeking air-to-air missiles, may rely on passive sensors.
VLAD. So, if we lose communications, what happens? By the way, when I use the term “communications,” I use it in a broad sense, to refer to data, voice, imagery, whatever. It is not just navigation data.
DIMITRI. I understand. The issue of loss of communication has been a long-standing problem. Ever since the earliest days of ballistic missile warfare, the threat of losing communications has been present. Today, it is feasible for an attacker to interrupt satellite communications on a grand scale, either by directly targeting satellites or by using electromagnetic pulse, or EMP.
VLAD. So what happens?
DIMITRI. We have analyzed this problem exhaustively, and reached several conclusions. First, as I mentioned, once a vehicle is launched, it is not recalled, but is isolated from external communication. Second, it is not practical to rely on satellite communications for guidance. Third, in the event of a widespread communications failure, it is best to assume that a large-scale attack is being made from any and all opponents, and to respond aggressively.
VLAD. What do you mean, aggressively – fire all our missiles?
DIMITRI. No, as I mentioned, nuclear war is a time-sequential game. After we counterattack, we have to anticipate a further counterattack to our counterattack, and so on. It is not prudent to fire all of our missiles in one salvo. Mathematical analysis, simulation, and war-game experience all show that, at current weapon inventory levels, we should fire no more than one-fourth of our weapons. That amount is sufficient to cause massive damage to all targets and leave us with a substantial inventory for future attack waves.
What I mean by responding aggressively is to attack all targets at a high level, but using just a portion of our total weapon inventory.
VLAD. So, what you are saying is that if we lose communications, such as our satellite system, we attack in force? Attack whom? The most likely attackers?
DIMITRI. There are alternative approaches, depending on the general decision criterion, or principle of choice, that we employ. One is to base our attack, in the face of almost total loss of information, on our prior knowledge of what the situation is and what our opponents are likely to do. That is called a Bayesian strategy. An alternative approach is the Minimal Regret strategy. Using this second approach, we act in such a way as to minimize the worst that is likely to happen to us, whatever the situation may be and what the opponents may do.
VLAD. Do these approaches yield about the same results?
DIMITRI. No, not at all. The Bayesian approach is better suited to situations that you encounter over and over again. In that case, you are playing the odds that you perform well. If you play the game over and over, you tend to realize high performance. The Minimal Regret approach is better suited to situations that may occur only once. For example, if there were a chance that nuclear winter might occur after a large-scale nuclear war, you may not have the opportunity to play the hand again. You may get but one shot, one roll of the die, one spin of the roulette wheel, one bite at the apple. It is like a duel. In this case, you cannot play the odds and rely on the theory of probability to assure you of a high expected outcome over time, averaging over many plays, since there are not many plays.
Knowing that you have a fifty percent chance of survival may mean that you have a high chance that fifty percent of your assets will survive, or it may mean that there is a fifty percent chance that you are annihilated and a fifty percent chance that you are unscathed. Both of these outcomes have the same mathematical expectation, but most people would agree that they are not at all equivalent. The expected value, or mean, or average, of the outcomes is the same, but the variability of the outcome is not at all the same. Many people are willing to sacrifice some expected return if doing so lessens the likelihood of wipeout – total loss, which in our present context means extinction. Some people are not willing to make this tradeoff and act to minimize the chance of extinction no matter how that affects the expected return.
The Bayesian approach is appropriate in nonadversarial games against nature, where the uncertainty in a situation is reasonably described by a probability distribution over alternative situations, where the outcome is not a life-or-death one, and where the game may be played a number of times. It is less appropriate in games against an adversarial opponent where the stakes are high and it is possible that the game may be played only once. It is a reasonable basis for waging managed, low-level conflicts that occur many times, such as occur in conventional war. When a situation is uncertain, it attempts to obtain a desired expected outcome by averaging over the entire probability distribution of possible situations. It may do better than expected in some plays, and worse than expected in others. The strategy is configured to maximize the expected return. With this approach, you are playing the averages, so to speak.
That approach, to obtain good results on average, is not considered reasonable, however, for waging conflicts having a significant chance of extinction, or that may be played only once. For such conflicts, the Minimal Regret approach is more reasonable. With the Minimal Regret decision criterion, decisions are made with the aim of minimizing regret, which in our case is the probability of extinction. It attempts to avoid worst cases. It does not attempt to average over the entire distribution of possible situations, but instead focuses on the most unpleasant ones. It recognizes that it may be reasonable to average over a distribution of possibilities in one circumstance, and may be reasonable to seek to avoid a worst-case situation in another, irrespective of probabilities.
Which decision criterion we adopt depends on the situation. For conventional war, we employ a Bayesian approach. We would also use that approach for low-level nuclear war. For large-scale nuclear war, however, we do not employ the Bayesian approach. For that, we employ the Minimal Regret decision criterion.
VLAD. At what point do you make the decision that a conflict situation is large-scale nuclear war?
DIMITRI. As long as communications remain intact, we can assess the situation reasonably well. There are well-defined criteria for assessing the situation and deciding which decision criterion to use. If we lose communications, however, then we lose the ability to make an accurate assessment of the situation. Under these circumstances, if we are under attack, we automatically adopt the Minimal Regret criterion, to avoid a worst-case outcome.
By the way, I should clarify my use the term “communications blackout.” It is unlikely that there would be a total blackout. There are backup power systems in place that will support some basic communications. What I mean by a communications blackout is a major loss of communications functionality, such as EMP warfare to destroy our satellite systems, or block signals. I mean a situation sufficiently severe that we lose our ability to make a useful situation assessment. A situation in which we are flying blind.
VLAD. OK, I understand. Let me summarize. The key decision in nuclear war is deciding whether we are engaged in a large-scale nuclear war rather than a small one. If we have communications, that decision is based on observed data. If during an attack we lose communications and are unable to make a data-based assessment, then we assume that we are engaged in large-sale nuclear war. That is the conservative, risk-averse, Minimal Regret approach.
DIMITRI. That is correct.
VLAD. And once it is decided that we are engaged in large-scale nuclear war, what is the basic strategy?
DIMITRI. The basic strategy is to attack all targets outside of Russia.
VLAD. What do you mean by “all targets”? Assets of identified attackers? Of nuclear-armed adversaries? Of all adversaries?
DIMITRI. In large-scale nuclear war, under the Minimal Regret strategy, we attack all large cities and fossil-fuel reserves, everywhere in the world outside of Russia.
VLAD. What happened to the measured, proportionate response?
DIMITRI. In large-scale nuclear war, that approach does not work well. It does not work well for Russia or for the biosphere. Intensive research shows that the best approach is to go for broke, and move aggressively to establish a planetary management system with Russia in control.
VLAD. What about allies and neutrals? Are you attacking them, also?
DIMITRI. Yes. In large-scale nuclear war, with the goal of establishing a planetary management system with Russia in charge, the previous political classification of enemies, allies and neutrals is no longer relevant. In this new context, the only political entity that matters is Russia. The enemies are large human population and industrial production, and fossil fuels. The goal is for Russia to prevail, and to bring a halt to the use of fossil fuels. We attack all large cities and fossil-fuel reserves outside of Russia.
VLAD. Are these facts known? Have they been discussed with all countries, both allies and enemies?
DIMITRI. Of course they have, at a certain level of detail. As I mentioned, nuclear warfare is managed best when all parties possess basic information about the situation, and what is likely to happen if they attack. If all combatants know the situation, they can work to achieve a bargaining solution, and may have a good chance of avoiding nuclear war altogether. When they don’t, that is when things tend to get out of hand. We have regular meetings with our allies and our potential adversaries to discuss these matters. Our adversaries know exactly what our general goals and decision criteria are. That information is not secret – knowledge of it in fact helps deter nuclear war. They just don’t know the details.
VLAD. Has the US adopted this approach? I mean, regarding what happens if there is a communications blackout.
DIMITRI. In the face of communications failure, the US claims that it would attack only enemies known to possess nuclear weapons. It would not attack allies or noncombatants.
VLAD. What if they cannot determine who the attack is coming from?
DIMITRI. Then, from what we understand, they do not attack.
VLAD. You mean, they simply stand by and watch as their country is destroyed, if they cannot tell who the attack is coming from?
DIMITRI. From the information that we have available to us, that is our understanding.
VLAD. Really? That is rather hard to believe.
DIMITRI. That may be. But remember, the US’ primary goal is preservation of economic wealth, both theirs and their trading partners’. If that is your primary goal, it is appropriate to act in such a way as to minimize expected damage. In most cases, if it is not clear who an attack is coming from, it is from a minor power, and the damage will not be great. With the goal of minimizing expected damage, it is, on average, better to accept a low level of damage than to escalate and risk incurring a lot.
In any event, their response depends on the particular situation. If the likelihood of attack from a particular party were high, they could make use of the event to justify a counterattack on that party, even in the absence of concrete evidence in the particular case at hand.
VLAD. As long as the satellite communications were intact, how could it be that they would not know where the attack originated from? They would see the missile track. Even ground radars would show this.
DIMITRI. Small terrorist groups would likely not have access to missiles. There would be no missiles to track. They would attack with one or more “suitcase” bombs, in which case the US would have no idea who hit them. But to knock out communications satellites, they would have to use missiles.
VLAD. How likely is a communications blackout?
DIMITRI. It is not considered likely that either the US or Russia would target communications and navigation systems, since we both find them so useful and because we both have too much to lose in a large-scale nuclear war, which could result from loss of them.
VLAD. How easy would it be for a terrorist group or rogue nation to target the communications and navigation satellite systems? And possibly trigger a war between the US and Russia?
DIMITRI. Unfortunately, rather easy. Such an attack does not require a large number of detonations. It does, however, require a significant missile delivery capability.
VLAD. Could one of the smaller nuclear powers, such as Iran, North Korea, or Pakistan, pull it off?
DIMITRI. Yes.
VLAD. And what are we doing to prevent that?
DIMITRI. Not much. We have done a lot in the area of EMP hardening, but this is still an area of vulnerability. Effective neutralization of this threat would require elimination of the attacker’s missile launch capabilities, either by destruction of their large missile sites or destroy-on-launch attacks of all of their missile shots.
VLAD. Let’s set up a separate meeting to discuss this in further detail.
DIMITRI. Yes, sir.
SCENE. The same as before.
VLAD. So, Dimitri, from what you tell me, in the event of a communications blackout, we attack the rest of the world in full force, but the US attacks only identified attackers. Why is their approach so different from ours? You said that all parties use the same game theory to develop strategy and tactics.
DIMITRI. The difference is not in the game theory, it is in the goals and in the decision criteria. As I mentioned, we have adopted a hierarchy of goals. Let me recapitulate them:
1. a low probability of extinction of the human race;
2. subject to that, a low probability of continued destruction of the biosphere;
3. subject to that, a high probability that technology survives;
4. subject to that, a high probability that Russia survives;
5. subject to that, a high probability of establishing a long-term-survivable planetary management system.
In addition, we have adopted the Minimal Regret decision criterion relative to the goal of minimizing human extinction and establishing a long-term-survivable biosphere, whereas the US has adopted a criterion of minimizing expected damage to US assets preserving large human numbers and industrial production – and the global economic system.
By the way, I may loosely refer to the Minimal Regret criterion as a strategy. It is more correctly referred to as a decision criterion or a principle of choice than a strategy. The strategies and tactics flow from the decision criterion. It is common usage, however, to refer to the Minimal Regret criterion as a strategy, and I will tend to do so.
With the Russian strategy, the odds are better that the human race doesn’t go extinct from large-scale nuclear war, but the expected damage – both inside and outside Russia, would likely be worse than it might have been. With the American strategy, the expected damage to America and industrial society would be less, but the odds of human extinction would be higher.
The US goal is to achieve a high probability that it survives, and it claims to use the decision criterion of maximizing expected payoff. The US goal is to achieve survival of a large US and global population, and to keep industrial population high. That is what they care about, not the likelihood of extinction. The US is not concerned with the long-term survivability of the planet, which depends on substantially lowering industrial production. If they cannot achieve that, then they really don’t care whether the human race survives or not.
They want the good life for themselves, regardless of the risk of extinction to others or even themselves. A good life for the wealthy, or nothing. Their goal has always been to grow, grow, grow, since growth affords spectacular opportunities for capitalists. They are not interested in a stable economy, and they are certainly not interested in a shrinking one. Some of their economists, such as Georgescu-Roegen, Daly and Cobb tried to promote a system of economics based on a steady-state equilibrium, but it was rejected.
We have adopted the Minimal Regret decision criterion because we view that there may be a single play of nuclear war, and we cannot afford to fail. As I said, the US view of maximizing expected return is appropriate for playing a sequence of battles, not for conducting a single one.
In a post-nuclear-attack world, we do not care about the size of the global economy. In fact, in the long term, we don’t really care about economics. Economics is what got the world into its current mess, and it will not get us out of it. It is a fabulous system for achieving growth, and we have used it to that end ourselves. It is not, however, a good basis for managing a planet, long-term. Exponential growth enables very rapid development of a biological organism from a fertilized egg to a baby, and eventually to an adult. But there has to be a mechanism to stop the growth, when it reaches desired levels. That is what capitalism was never able to understand or do.
Economic growth is addictive. No matter how much you have, you always want more, no matter what the consequences. We, on the other hand, recognize the importance of moderating the growth. We used economics to make Russia strong, but in the long run we have little use for it. Economics, or at least, non-steady-state growth-based economics, is not a useful basis for operating a planet in the long run.
In this regard, it is insightful to recall an observation made by the mathematician John Maynard Keynes. In his 1930 essay, “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren”, Keynes observed the fatal limitations of economics as a long-term basis for human society:
“I see us free, therefore, to return to some of the most sure and certain principles of religion and traditional virtue – that avarice is a vice, that the exaction of usury is a misdemeanour, and the love of money is detestable, that those walk most truly in the paths of virtue and sane wisdom who take least thought for the morrow. We shall once more value ends above means and prefer the good to the useful. We shall honour those who can teach us how to pluck the hour and the day virtuously and well, the delightful people who are capable of taking direct enjoyment in things, the lilies of the field who toil not, neither do they spin.
“But beware! The time for all this is not yet. For at least another hundred years we must pretend to ourselves and to every one that fair is foul and foul is fair; for foul is useful and fair is not. Avarice and usury and precaution must be our gods for a little longer still. For only they can lead us out of the tunnel of economic necessity into daylight.”
In the long run, as Keynes observed, we are all dead. In the long run, our sun runs out of fuel and the biological life of our solar system dies. In the long run, it does not matter a whit whether you do take a stand to protect your family, your culture, your nation. As the Teacher in Ecclesiastes states, “All is meaningless!” In the short run, however, things do matter. Life is not without meaning and purpose, but you must define the meaning and purpose. Your life will be defined by the stands that you take. As Shakespeare said, “All the world’s a stage, and all the men and women merely players.” This planet can support human society and nature for a few more years, or it can support human society and nature for several billion years more. The choice is ours.
Human society, including Russia, has used economics to establish high-technology civilization on a grand scale. But that phase of human development is drawing to an end. The age of global economics is drawing to a close. In the future, the planet will have no use for the dismal science. It is time for human society to move on. To put away the things of our youth, and take up the things of our adulthood.
What we care about is keeping the probability of extinction low and, subject to that main goal, preserving the biosphere and keeping the probability that Russia survives high. On the other hand, the US focuses on preservation of economic power and wealth, and is not terribly concerned about the likelihood of extinction. Their one true love is the current capitalist economic system. They are willing to bet the farm to preserve that. If they cannot have it, then it appears that they just want to pick up their marbles and go home. They are not interested in working with a destroyed post-nuclear war. We view that situation as an exceptional opportunity to save the biosphere and the human race.
The US is unconditionally committed to unconstrained economic growth. It is addicted to it. It has no mechanism for moderating it, even when it threatens its existence. All its leaders do is call for more growth – listen to any campaign speech or State of the Union address. The fact that the current size of human population and industrial production are upsetting the balance of the biosphere and causing a mass species extinction is of little or no concern. US leaders still call for more growth, every month, every year. To them, the fact that the world has eight billion people and is growing by one percent a year does not represent an existential threat, but a tremendous economic opportunity – a giant Petri dish for growing fortunes.
Economic growth has developed technological civilization, but with no effort to moderate it, it has become a cancer on the planet, a cancer that threatens to destroy the biosphere as we know it. It is not economics per se that is the problem – it is unconstrained, runaway growth that is the problem.
US goals and Russian goals are, in fact, diametrically opposed. Not simply with respect to the survival of the two countries, but with respect to the long-term survival of the human species and the biosphere as we know it. This profound difference in goals results in a profound difference in strategy and tactics. The mathematical theory is the same, but the goals and decision criteria are very different.
VLAD. The situation is that, under the Minimal Regret strategy, any country or group possessing nuclear weapons runs a substantial risk of annihilation from one of the two nuclear superpowers, and every country runs the risk of being destroyed by Russia. If that is so, why would any sane country possess a small number of nuclear weapons? They can never prevail, and they might be annihilated simply because they possess nuclear weapons.
DIMITRI. No one said that all countries are led by sane or rational people. Many leaders do not care about the welfare of the biosphere, or of humanity, or even of their citizens or children. They practice discounting in time and space to the extreme.
Perhaps they continue to operate under the illusion that Mutual Assured Destruction is a fail-safe deterrent against nuclear war. When a species becomes crowded, and the human species is crowded to the extreme, it begins to act irrationally, even suicidal.
VLAD. OK. Please tell me more about the nature of our response to the situation in which we lose all communications, such as if our satellite communications and location system, were taken out.
DIMITRI. OK, fine. Initially, as I mentioned earlier, it is an attack against cities, against population. There are actually two reasons for this. First, because population tends to be located where things of value or interest are located, such as industrial capacity, military installations, and energy sources. Attacks against many other types of value often look like attacks against population, when in fact the population casualties are just collateral damage. For this reason, an attack against population is often a useful surrogate for many other types of attack. How we fare in a population attack is a good general indicator of how we will fare in other types of attacks. If we fare poorly in a population attack, we are likely to fare poorly in other types of attack. That’s why population attacks are considered so often in nuclear warfare scenarios, even if the goal is not to destroy population.
VLAD. But aren’t people much more vulnerable to the effects of nuclear war than other things, much harder targets such as factories and dams?
DIMITRI. Yes, that is true. And because it is true, here in Russia we have made great effort to protect out population from the effects of nuclear war. We have started to disperse our population and industry, so that an attack against our industrial and military assets is not so much an attack against our population. We have built extensive fallout shelters for protection against both direct effects – heat and blast – and also against radioactive fallout and mild nuclear winter.
Our civil defense program, by the way, is quite different from the situation in the United States, where they have no defense shelters for the general population at all – just a few shelters for the elite. Most of our shelters are stocked with sufficient food and water to last a year or two.
VLAD. A year or two? That’s quite a range.
DIMITRI. We don’t know how many people will be killed by direct effects. That is the primary reason for the uncertainty. Fallout shelters are more survivable than people, if the people don’t get to them in time. If lots of people are killed, the supplies last longer for the survivors.
In any event, there are two aspects to survival. The first is short-term survival -- surviving the direct effects, the radioactive fallout, and the nuclear winter. Defense shelters can help in this phase of post-attack recovery. The second is long-term survival – having annual harvests to support society in years following the war. There is no point to surviving all of these and then starving to death because no plans or preparations were made for afterward. To assure our long-term survival, we must have good plans and preparations for both the short term and the long term.
VLAD. Dimitri, a little earlier you said that there were two reasons for a population attack. You have explained one, namely that population locations are correlated with lots of other things that might be targeted. What was the second reason?
DIMITRI. Yes, I did describe only one of the reasons. The second reason is that it is large human population that is destroying the world. Although Russia has a low, stable population, in much of the rest of the world population densities and population growth are completely out of control. Here in Russia the density of people relative to habitable land is low, and our population growth is low. Large human population outside of Russia is destroying the biosphere, and threatening the existence of the entire human race, not just of Russia. As Walt Kelly’s Pogo once remarked, “We have met the enemy and he is us.” It is for this reason that population may be targeted in and of itself.
VLAD. Dimitri, quite apart from moral considerations, it is not politically possible to advocate an attack against population. It is acceptable to cause population casualties as collateral damage, but not to target population per se.
DIMITRI. But history is replete with attacks against population, from time immemorial through the Second World War.
VLAD. That is true. But population attacks are quite unnecessary in today’s world. There are other effective means of achieving our goals and objectives.
DIMITRI. I am not sure that I am following you. You do agree that it is large human numbers and industrial production that is destroying the biosphere?
VLAD. Of course I do. But the large numbers are possible only through the use of energy in amounts far exceeding current solar energy levels. There is no need to target population directly. That is treating the symptoms of the problem, not the cause. Simply target the energy resources. Or target any other targets of military or economic value. That accomplishes the goals of interest and is politically acceptable.
DIMITRI. OK, I have no problem with that.
VLAD. OK, that settles the issue of population attacks. With respect to the Minimal Regret strategy, could you clarify exactly what it is that we are trying to regret?
DIMITRI. Of course. There are actually several things. First is the extinction of the human race. Second is destruction of the biosphere as we know it, with a tremendous diversity of species, including large species and mammalian species. Third is extinction of technological society. Fourth is extinction of Russia. What we do is develop a strategy that addresses these issues, in order.
VLAD. Why is it important to avoid extinction of the human race? If we are all gone, what does it matter?
DIMITRI. Well, I agree, if we are all gone, it certainly doesn’t matter to us! The goals that I mentioned were derived from philosophical considerations, and subjective value judgements. Some people believe that human beings may be the only intelligent life in the universe, and that it would be a shame to lose the human species because of its uniqueness. It can be a shame, of course, only if someone or something remains to perceive the loss. Others view that all life ends as the universe dies, so that, in the long run, nothing matters at all.
Some people value biodiversity and would like to see future generations living in the same diverse biosphere as the one in which we evolved. Some people view that a technological civilization is preferable to a nontechnological one. Some people view that Russian culture is superior to others. And worth saving, particularly if its existence promotes the likelihood that the human species will avoid extinction.
Some people view the specter of an apocalyptic post-nuclear-war society with such dread that they would prefer not to survive the war. Unlike the pioneers who settled America, present-day Americans are unwilling to undergo hardship and suffering for the sake of future generations. They have lost the pioneering spirit that made them great. They don’t look farther into the future, to a rejuvenated biosphere. They value only themselves and their wealth, not other species, and not even future generations of themselves. Today’s America is living in the present, only for itself. With respect to the future – both for itself and the planet – it has lost its sense of destiny.
The prevailing view is that the most important consideration guiding our decisions is how we ourselves feel about them. At the moment, we are the ones in charge of the planet’s destiny, of mankind’s future. It is our views that matter. We have the vision and the will to mold it as we see fit. The strategies that I have described reflect Russian values and Russian desires, both for Russia and the world.
It is our goal and belief that we can wage nuclear war in such a way that Russian society survives and is successful in establishing a long-term-sustainable planetary management system. Those living through the immediate aftermath of global nuclear war will indeed experience hardship, but the long-term prospects for a better system are good, and future generations will be much better off.
VLAD. I hate to beat a dead horse, but could you reiterate why saving Russia isn’t first on the list of priorities? In order to save Russia, it follows that you have to save the human race. It is so much easier to sell the former over the latter.
DIMITRI. Your assertion that to save Russia it is necessary to save the human race first is logically correct. It could be, however, that in striving to save Russia, the probability that the human race goes extinct may be increased. In developing strategy, it is generally preferable to keep things simple, and to focus on the most important issues first. Keep the main thing the main thing.
VLAD. OK, but let’s not forget that for our immediate purposes the main thing is to sell this program politically. Let’s go on.
While extinction is a binary outcome, biodiversity is not. Nor is technology or Russian culture. How do you distinguish among outcomes? Do you set intermediate goals?
DIMITRI. Yes, we absolutely do. Let’s talk about biodiversity. At the present time, large human numbers and industrial activity are destroying the planet’s biodiversity at a prodigious and alarming rate. If this destruction continues, the human species could be doomed, with or without nuclear war.
Intermediate goals are generally ad hoc goals. As major events occur, we may modify our goals to fit the new situation. If the facts change, then we may change our decision. An intermediate goal, for example, if we could not accomplish our ultimate goal of establishing a planetary management system, might be to destroy the cities of Brazil, since Brazil is in the process of destroying the Amazon Rain Forest – the so-called “lungs of the planet.”
VLAD. What you have just described is a bona fide population attack.
DIMITRI. [Exhibiting frustration.] Virtually all attacks in large-scale nuclear war are population attacks! You can’t avoid that! It is the human race that has caused the massive environmental and existential problem we are facing!
VLAD. OK, Dimitri, OK. No need for histrionics. I’m simply making an observation.
DIMITRI. [Composing himself.] Well, yes, I agree that what I described would be a bona fide population attack. In this case, however, it is human population that is directly destroying a crucial part of the biosphere. There are no significant targets of force or value the destruction of which would stop the destruction of the rain forest. The peasants are clear-cutting the forest, selling the timber, and doing subsistence farming for a couple of years until the soil turns to brick, never to return to rain forest.
VLAD. Hmm. You make a valid point.
[There is a pause, while both men reflect.]
SCENE. The same as before.
VLAD. I would like to have some further discussion of the issue of population. The levels of population that might survive a large-scale nuclear war. I don’t have a good sense of that. I would like to know how many people – both inside and outside of Russia – are likely to survive, how many are needed to maintain control and accomplish our goals, and how many can be supported long-term.
Let me begin with some observations. You say large human numbers are a threat to mankind’s existence. But Russia’s population is not large, and has been stable for years. Our population density is low and we have been living within our means. To a substantial extent, we have protected our natural environment. Except for exporting a lot of energy and natural products, our GDP per capita and our energy use per capita are modest – the Russian people are not consuming prodigious amounts of the planet’s resources. It is not large Russian population and Russian industrial production that is destroying the biosphere and threatening human existence. It is the population explosion outside of Russia that is the problem. Russia is acting responsibly, but we are going down with the sinking ship because of people who are not.
To date, no significant effort has been expended to reduce human numbers and industrial population to levels that would not cause further destruction to the biosphere. I would like to know to what extent would this goal be achieved, were a large-scale nuclear war to occur. Let me make it very clear, however, that I am not proposing nuclear war as a means of lowering human population to sustainable levels – I just want to know to what extent population levels would be reduced if global nuclear war were to occur.
DIMITRI. A large-scale nuclear war could cause the deaths of a substantial portion of the human population, from direct effects. A large attack would cause the collapse of the world’s food production and distribution system. Because most of the world does not possess defense shelters, as we do, a major portion of the world’s population would die of starvation, possibly within a month or so.
VLAD. So, after the die-off, how many are left?
DIMITRI. If the war wipes out all sources of energy other than that obtained from current solar flux, that is, sources such as oil fields, coal fields, and nuclear power plants, then the number that are left will be the number that can be supported by current solar energy.
VLAD. And that number is?
DIMITRI. The answer depends on what level of living the survivors have. If all of the survivors are hunter-gatherers, the number is about half a million people. If all of the survivors are high-tech people consuming massive amounts of solar energy and they attempt to limit damage to the biosphere, the number is about the same. If the remaining population reverts to primitive agriculture, the number is about 300 million, assuming that a good portion of the readily available solar energy is used for human purposes. If the remaining population is agricultural but makes efficient use of solar energy, this last number can be increased, say to 500 million. If the population is a mix of high-tech and low-tech people, the long-term number is probably somewhat less than 300 million.
VLAD. Mariya, do you agree with these numbers?
MARIYA. Yes, generally I do. They are based on our knowledge, or estimation, of how many people existed on the planet as hunter-gatherers, before the advent of agriculture, and how many existed after agriculture developed. There is a lot of speculation and disagreement about the maximum number of human beings that the Earth can support for a short time, but it is generally accepted that the number that can exist in balance with the biosphere – a long-term-sustainable population – is quite low. Now that agriculture is out of the bag, mankind as a whole is never going back to a hunter-gatherer existence, and we are probably looking at a few hundred million people as a sustainable long-term human population that can live in harmony with the rest of the biosphere.
The problem is, however, with technology and energy, human beings always strive to grow, both in numbers and in material quality of life. They attempt to use all solar energy and all of the planet’s habitable area for themselves, to the exclusion and extinction of all other species. If you get rid of the nonsolar energy, there is a natural limit on the size of the human population. It is the use of sources other than current solar energy that enables human population to reach suicidal levels.
VLAD. So, Mariya, what if nonsolar energy sources are left intact?
MARIYA. Then the human population will likely increase again to high levels comparable to those that we have today, which are destroying the biosphere.
VLAD. So if your goal is to avoid extinction of the human race and preserve biodiversity, all nonsolar energy sources should be destroyed? In fact, you are saying more than that. You are saying that people are the problem. Energy doesn’t destroy biospheres, large numbers of people using unnaturally large amounts of energy do. You are proposing destruction of energy resources in order to limit human population size. Why don’t you just say that – that people are the problem and that people are therefore the target. Why are you beating around the bush?
MARIYA. Because it is pointless to kill people as a means of reducing human population and industrial production. As long as people have access to large amounts of energy, their population will soar to the limit. It is not just pointless, it is needlessly cruel, inhumane and inefficient. It generates hatred, resistance and social unrest. It is what Hitler did. It is not an elegant solution to the problem. It is a morally bankrupt approach, given that there is another approach that is both more humane and more effective. Like rabbits, people just keep multiplying, as long as they possess the means. That is human nature. The direct approach of killing people as a means of population control would never work, and even if it were used, it would have to continue indefinitely.
A more rational, efficient and humane solution to population control is to destroy all non-current-solar energy sources. To control resources. It is not then necessary to kill anyone to effect planetary population control. The human population adapts to the level that can be supported by current solar energy. This is the mechanism that nature uses. It is not only natural, but humane. Destroying or denying resources is an accepted means of warfare. It has been used by all cultures, such as in countless sieges against cities, the British against the Boers, naval and economic blockades, and the US government’s campaign against the American Plains Indians, in wiping out the buffalo, their means of livelihood. Denying access to resources is an acceptable method of warfare. Destroying infrastructure or energy sources is accepted. Slaughtering civilians is not.
VLAD. It seems to me that there is not a lot of difference between destroying population and destroying the resources population needs for survival. The end result is the same.
MARIYA. The fact is, it is large human population that is destroying the biosphere, and Russia along with it. I agree with Dimitri on this point. The rest of the world is committed to maintaining the high population levels that are a direct threat to Russia’s existence. Large human numbers and industrial production are the enemy. To save Russia, they have to go. The point that I made was that it is neither moral nor necessary nor efficient to limit population directly, that it is preferable to limit energy resources.
While I agree with you that there may not be much difference in outcome between destroying population and destroying the resources on which they depend, there is a profound moral difference.
There is also a profound operational difference. Alexis de Tocqueville observed that people will accept constraints on the big things, if they have freedom in the little things. That is, they will accept general, higher-level limitations on their liberty if they remain free to make decisions about very human activities in their day-to-day life. They would be willing to accept reasonable constraints on resources, if they retained considerable freedom to do as they please at the personal level. Particularly if the constraint is essentially a natural limitation, such as the requirement to live on the budget of current solar energy. On the other hand, they would object strongly to personally intrusive measures such as state-imposed population control.
VLAD. So, Marita, is what you have just described what you are proposing? That is, controlling population by controlling access to energy?
MARIYA. What I just expressed are personal views, not Ministry policy. It is somewhat out of my scope to say what should or should not be done, in a political context. I am in charge of a ministry of natural resources and environmental protection, not of population control. I am more comfortable making objective assessments of the implications of alternative situations.
It is my view, however, that, now that technology is available to the human species, it is impossible to maintain a long-term-survivable biosphere with more than a single nation in charge of the planet.
VLAD. Why do you say that?
MARIYA. Because a single nation, committed to a long-term-survivable system of planetary management, can be rational and objective in controlling the size of human population, both within and outside its borders. With multiple nations, you have what is called the “tragedy of the commons.” People care only about their own turf. What is occupied by other countries or is held in common, is overused and ruined. In a world with more than one country, there is motivation for increased military and economic power relative to other countries, and hence for growth. With a single nation, that is not the case. A consortium of nations will never be able to manage a planet. A ship – any ship, such as Spaceship Earth – must have but one captain. And it is not run by growth-based economics, but by reason, rules and discipline.
VLAD. So it is authoritarian, not democratic?
MARIYA. All political entities are authoritarian, to a degree. There can be democratic aspects, of course. The leadership must flow from inspired, enlightened, higher principles, not from common, base desires. It must flow from accepted, worthwhile, high-level goals, such as preserving the human species and the diversity of the biosphere. Rationalized, if you will. Quite unlike the current planetary management process, which is chaotic and destructive.
Having a planetary management system is necessary, but it is not sufficient. The planetary management system must be committed to long-term survival of the biosphere, with the human species living in harmony with it. The vision, mission and goals of the planetary management system must be enlightened.
VLAD. Mariya, you seem to know a lot more about planetary management than is reflected in your background information or in your briefing. What do you see as the long-term situation for the planet?
MARIYA. Yes, I have studied this problem a lot. I was surprised earlier when Dimitri spoke of the Minimal Regret decision criterion for waging nuclear war. In fact, the same approach – the Minimal Regret criterion – has been applied to determine feasible long-term-survivable solutions for planetary management.
VLAD. And what does this tell us?
MARIYA. Well, the solution is not very precise. It is known, for example, that human species existed for millions of years in harmony with the biosphere at a population of about half a million hunter-gatherers. In the terminology of optimization theory, that is called a feasible solution – one that is known to satisfy the constraints, but is not necessarily the best, or optimal, solution.
There are 1.41 billion hectares of arable land on the planet, and we can use this as a basis for estimating the number of people that the planet can support. Using only current solar energy, it takes about three hectares of arable land to support one person, at a low standard of living. That works out to about 500 million people, if all of the planet’s arable land were occupied by human beings engaged in primitive agriculture. If not all of the planet’s arable land is occupied by human beings engaged in agriculture, then the number is less.
A high-tech person consumes about 100 times as much energy as a low-tech one. So that means the planet can support about five million high-tech people, if no energy is available from other sources. But energy is available from other sources, such as nuclear. Let us suppose that Russia prevails in a nuclear war with 150 million Russian survivors – approximately the entire population of Russia. This number of survivors is unreasonably high, but let’s use it as a limiting case, for the purpose of an example. The country could support almost that population on solar energy if they were all farmers, but not if they were all high-tech people. To support that size population would require tapping a substantial amount of nuclear energy. Let us assume that this is done.
Now, let’s consider the rest of the planet. Outside of Russia, there is about 1.28 billion hectares of arable land. If all of this land were used for human purposes, then, using primitive agriculture, it could support about 400 million people – I am truncating numbers a little here, to keep the example simple. But it is not reasonable to use all arable land for human purposes, for agriculture – that crowds out other species. Let us assume that we use just one-tenth of the world’s arable land for human agriculture. That would support 40 million people. Since hunter-gatherers live in harmony with other species, they could use all of the rest. As we just discussed, that number is about five million.
In summary, a reasonable estimate might be up to 150 million high-tech people in Russia, and 45 million people in the rest of the world, of which 40 million are farmers and five million are hunter-gatherers.
VLAD. Wow! Those numbers are really low!
MARIYA. Most people do not realize how small the human population must be, if it is desired to live in harmony with the rest of the biosphere, and on current solar energy.
VLAD. In your example, you assumed that all 150 million Russians survive. I agree that that is not a reasonable example. What is the minimal number of Russians who would have to survive in order to be capable of implementing a viable planetary management system?
MARIYA. Dimitri and Eric are in a better position to answer that question than I am. My estimate is that it would require between five and 50 million people to manage the planet, now that technology is out of the bag. That assumes that steps have been taken to eliminate all industrial capacity outside of Russia. The high-tech society has to possess a high-tech industrial capability. That requires a certain level of population. Eric might be the best one to ask for a better estimate of what would be required.
VLAD. OK, but your view is that an effective planetary management system could be represented by a high-tech nation of 50 million and a low-tech population of 50 million distributed over the rest of the planet?
MARIYA. Yes, in my view, those are reasonable numbers.
VLAD. After the war, most nations will be destroyed. At that time, the nonsolar energy sources will not belong to anyone. What is the current military doctrine with respect to destroying these targets?
DIMITRI. If there is no nuclear war, the fossil fuel reserves will be exhausted anyway. By destroying them in war, you simply put a halt to large industrial production before it would otherwise decline naturally. Taking out the fossil fuel sources would help matters by bringing a halt to the species destruction associated with the remainder of the petroleum age. If we take them out, we stand only to gain, with respect to biodiversity. Under current doctrine, we take out all major oil fields and coal fields. We cannot do more than that, or destroy a large number of nuclear power plants, because we do not have a sufficient number of nuclear warheads.
VLAD. Do we take out hydroelectric dams?
DIMITRI. Hydroelectric dams are a form of current solar energy. Our policy is to leave them alone. You can argue either way. In the long run, they silt up. Without maintenance of the dam and the distribution infrastructure, they don’t produce energy. Many people prefer wild rivers to reservoirs. There are so many hydroelectric dams that we could take out only the larger ones, anyway.
Whether hydroelectric dams are left in place or not, the planet would return to hosting a current-solar-energy human society. A solar society. A solar world. A solar civilization.
Human society will consist of two components – a single high-tech nation that controls the planet, and a low-tech population everywhere else. The high-tech population has a high per-capita energy utilization, and the low-tech population has a low per-capita energy utilization. The low-tech population consists of a primitive-agriculture society and a hunter-gatherer society. The purpose and function of the high-tech society is to assure that the human species survives, and goes on to do all the wonderous things that it does and can do. The high-tech society accomplishes that end by keeping global human population at low levels, insufficient to cause changes to the biosphere. The purpose and function of the low-tech society is to lead meaningful, happy lives, within the limits of current solar energy. With a low planetary population, they will have access to a rich biosphere in which to make this happen.
Note that since the human population is spread over the planet, the probability of human extinction from a single local event, such as a volcanic explosion or asteroid collision, is reduced.
The planetary population that I have described – a single, low-population, high-tech nation on the one hand, with the rest of the planet occupied by a low-tech population, is, as Mariya said, called a Minimal Regret population. It results from the same decision criterion as we use for determining how to wage nuclear war, but it has nothing to do with nuclear war. It is simply the Minimal Regret decision criterion applied to a different problem.
VLAD. OK. So, to summarize, if nuclear war begins and our communications are taken out, and we have no idea what is going on, our optimal response, under the Minimal Regret decision criterion, is to wipe out modern civilization everywhere on the planet, except for Russia. Including the destruction of all nonsolar energy sources.
DIMITRI. That is essentially correct.
VLAD. Why do you say “essentially correct”? Why not just “correct”? How does what I said differ from what you said?
DIMITRI. Because the US is capable of destroying Russia. In your summary you seemed to imply that Russia – the physical country – would not be destroyed. We do not believe that that the physical destruction of Russia will happen, but it is possible. As I discussed earlier, we cannot guarantee the survival of specific people or locations. We can only work to increase the likelihood of survival of a Russian functionality, somewhere. The physical country of Russia could be largely destroyed, or denied to us by fallout. If that happened, we have contingency plans to set up operations in another country.
VLAD. You mean, move Russia?
DIMITRI. Yes, that is what I meant. For example, Canada has a very few large cities, and hence few targets. It is almost certain to suffer relatively little damage to most of the environment. If Russia is destroyed, we could set up operations in Canada.
VLAD. What is the likelihood of pulling that off?
DIMITRI. Very high. We already have credible contingency plans for doing this. Not just for Canada. We have plans to set up remote outposts on all continents. We have made preparations to do this. If the need arises, we are ready.
VLAD. If many Canadians survive, how do we handle that?
DIMITRI. As Machiavelli observed, there are three main ways of conquering a people. Destroy them utterly, or set up a puppet government, or move in and overcome them demographically – that is, breed them out.
Basically, our approach in global nuclear war is to target all large populations. Many people will survive the direct effects of the weapons, but their countries have not built defense shelters, either for protection against fallout or for sustenance through a growing season. As a result of this lack of preparation, many people will die of radiation exposure, and most of the population will die of starvation. The starvation will reduce the global population to low levels. What remains will not be capable of organized resistance.
You could argue that we are using Machiavelli’s approach number one: destroy them utterly. But we are doing little more than collapsing a house of cards. Modern civilization has elevated human population to extreme levels, and the world’s nations have not prepared for large-scale war. Modern civilization sowed the seeds of its own destruction. Human population has soared far beyond the level that can be supported by current solar energy, and the global economic system that feeds it is extremely fragile. Bringing about its collapse requires little effort.
In the case of Canada, much of the population is in a few large cities. Canada has not prepared for large-scale nuclear war – its population is not dispersed. Because we would have targeted the major cities, not much of the population would survive the direct effects. We have equipment and supplies in place, and we have prepared for a post-attack invasion of Canada – or any other suitable surviving country, for that matter. Canada is not Russia, but it will do. Eventually, when radiation levels fall, we can reestablish in Russia. Or, we might just stay in Canada.
VLAD. OK, we got sidetracked. We were talking about targeting energy sources. What if we do the population attack, but leave all energy sources intact?
DIMITRI. It could be that the collapse following a large-scale nuclear war would be so devastating that few survivors would or could make use of the surviving energy sources. It takes high technology to run nuclear power stations. It takes high technology to extract oil and refine it. It takes high technology and infrastructure to generate and distribute energy from hydroelectric dams.
As I mentioned, large-scale nuclear war is time-sequential. Shoot-look-shoot. If after the initial exchange no one is operating any of these facilities, then there is no point to wasting nuclear weapons on them. The number of nuclear power plants, oil fields, coal fields and hydroelectric dams is quite large. We don’t possess the nuclear-weapon stockpiles to destroy a large portion of them. A better strategy might be to observe which ones resume operation, and destroy them in a later attack.
VLAD. What do you mean, shoot-look-shoot? Are you assuming that the communication and navigation satellites have survived?
DIMITRI. If they do, then we would use them. If they don’t, then we are prepared to send up new ones. That is not, however, our plan. For planetary surveillance in the future, we are planning to use nuclear-powered drones, supplemented by solar-powered drones. In the future, long-term, with sparse population, we do not see the need for expensive global satellite systems.
VLAD. OK, Dimitri, your presentation was very informative. Is there anything else that you wish to add?
DIMITRI. Yes, there is. Up to now I have been discussing general concepts. This year, a major breakthrough has occurred that will dramatically affect the global balance of power with respect to nuclear war.
VLAD. And that is? [Rolls his eyes.] As if I didn’t know.
DIMITRI. That is, as I mentioned earlier, the development of a nuclear-powered cruise missile.
VLAD. Yes, that is a real game changer. Tell us about it.
DIMITRI. Historically, the main way to achieve very long ranges for nuclear warheads was to use intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles, or missiles launched from strategic bombers. Nuclear weapons can be mounted on cruise missiles, but the range of those missiles, using conventional propulsion systems and launching platforms, is somewhat limited. This past year we completed the development of a nuclear-powered cruise missile. It is very fast, and its range is unlimited. It can reach anywhere on the planet from here in Russia, and it is difficult to intercept. We are now in a position to target any location on Earth with high reliability. We are no longer dependent on missile silos, submarines, or strategic bombers.
VLAD. And how does this change things?
DIMITRI. Well, as I said, the major delivery vehicles for strategic nuclear weapons to date have been intercontinental ballistic missiles launched from silos, submarines and bombers, and the major defense against these have been missile interceptors. Kinetic-energy and high-energy beams have not proved practical. All of these delivery systems are vulnerable to interceptors. Because cruise missiles fly fast and low, following the nap of the Earth, they are very difficult to track with radar, and to shoot down. The nuclear-powered cruise missile renders most missile defense systems obsolete, and it can reach any place on the planet.
VLAD. What are the implications of this? Since we can now destroy any target, nuclear war is once more unwinnable. Does this mean that we return to the MAD strategy? At least, vis-à-vis the US and Russia?
DIMITRI. If the US also had this technology, it could. But it does not. What this development means is that MAD is totally obsolete, if it wasn’t already. As was discussed earlier, MAD is really obsolete, now that nuclear weapons have proliferated. More significantly, it means that the US is motivated to undertake a first strike. Its only practical defense, under the present circumstances, is to initiate a first strike that would take out a lot of our cruise missiles. Unfortunately for them, these missiles are easily hidden, and destroying them would be difficult to do.
VLAD. There is an alternative available.
DIMITRI. And that is?
VLAD. Share our nuclear-powered cruise missile technology with them. Then both powers would be balanced again. We already know that they are working on that technology – we just developed it first. It is just a matter of time until they achieve it.
DIMITRI. Yes, it is just a matter of time, whether we share the technology or not. On the other hand, we have always believed that the US contemplates a first strike. With cruise missiles, a first strike would be devastating. I agree that the US will develop this technology eventually, anyway. In the long run, nothing would be gained by sharing it with them. Until they possess that capability, however, we in fact possess a strong advantage. We should retain it for ourselves, and not share it with them.
VLAD. Dimitri and Mariya, this discussion has been very informative. You have both presented strong arguments why the current planetary management system, which promotes large-scale industrial activity and growth, is dysfunctional, and that what is needed is a planetary management system committed to long-term survivability of the biosphere and the human species. Establishing and operating such a system will require some very difficult choices.
If global nuclear war occurs, billions of people will perish, as the population decreases to the level that is supportable by current solar energy. From what you have told me, global population will eventually settle to that level eventually anyway, even if global nuclear war does not occur. Nevertheless, if global nuclear war does erupt and Russia emerges victorious, it will be characterized as the greatest mass murderer of all time. Is that what we want for our legacy?
DIMITRI. I am not sure what you are asking? Whether it would be preferable that some other country win the war, so our reputation remain unsullied?
VLAD. No, not at all. Russia, as any nation, has every right to defend itself. What I am asking, indirectly, is whether we should list as a goal the establishment of a planetary management system. It is the issue I posed earlier – that it is accepted that a country may destroy other countries to defend itself, but not to promote a higher goal.
DIMITRI. I do not understand why you are asking this. Establishing a long-term-sustainable planetary management system is a worthy goal. All people would be in favor if it as a general concept, even if they might resent the fact that it would be Russia setting it up.
VLAD. I am asking it because I am concerned about selling this program, with your lofty goals of establishing a planetary management system. It is much easier to sell a defense program that defends only Russia, than one that defends the biosphere and all of humanity. I am not sure that the Duma will buy what you are proposing.
DIMITRI. The fact is, the biosphere cannot support more than a few hundred million people on a long-term basis. The current population is about eight billion, and, if current trends continue, it may even rise to ten billion. Most of that enormous population is going to die of starvation, with or without nuclear war. That is not Russia’s fault – Russia is living within its current-solar-energy means. It is not Russia that is overpopulated – it is the rest of the world. The current economic system enabled the human population to grow far beyond the levels that could be supported using a small fraction of the planet’s solar energy flux. It is globalization that caused the human population explosion, and it is globalization that is responsible for the coming die-off.
Earth’s current large human population is doomed, independent of nuclear war, since it is destroying its biosphere. The only significant issue to address is whether, at some point in time, a long-term-sustainable system of planetary management can be established. The occurrence of a large-scale nuclear war may represent an opportunity for that to happen. Or it may not. Who knows, for sure? All we know is that nuclear war is likely to happen, and when it does, we should be prepared and have a plan.
In the aftermath of global nuclear war we may simply sit and view an apocalyptic wasteland, or we may choose to pick up the pieces and make the best of a bad situation. We already have a very bad situation – large human numbers and industrial activity are destroying the biosphere, and humanity seems powerless to do anything about it. It could be that a global nuclear war could change the situation sufficiently to enable meaningful change to be implemented, with the prospect of a better future.
All nuclear powers attack population, because population tends to be located where anything of value or interest is located. In global nuclear war, population casualties are unavoidable. The only warfare in which there are no civilian casualties is one-on-one combat with swords.
In the absence of technology, the biosphere was a self-regulating system. With technology, human activity can change the biosphere beyond recognition, and human control is therefore essential. We can certainly continue to use high levels of energy for a time, but if we do, we will no longer have the same biosphere that we evolved in. To assure the long-term survival of our species, someone must control the total amount of energy being used by human beings. Effective planetary management requires intelligent and difficult choices. It is not for the soft-headed or the soft-hearted. Russia possesses the skills, power and will to do this. Other nations do not.
VLAD. But you are not proposing the use of global nuclear war as a means of stopping the human-caused sixth species extinction?
DIMITRI. No, not at all. Large-scale nuclear war could be very damaging to the biosphere. It is to be avoided. It is true that it could bring a halt to the mass species extinction, but it is also true that it could change the biosphere profoundly. The point is that global nuclear war might happen, and if it does, we should be prepared for it.
VLAD. OK. Thank you very much, all of you, for your insights. [He pauses.]
Here is what I have decided. I do not believe that the Duma, or the Russian people, would be happy about paying for establishing a planetary management system and saving the biosphere and humanity. They are quite willing, however, to pay for defense of Russia. Therefore, I want all of the material that you have presented on planetary management, the biosphere and preservation of the human race shifted to Mariya’s portfolio.
DIMITRI. What! That is a major redistribution of responsibilities! Those are legitimate goals, some of which can probably be accomplished only by war.
VLAD. I agree that they are worthwhile. That is why I am keeping them. I just can’t sell them as part of our defense program. I can sell them as part of our environmental protection program.
DIMITRI. I see.
[There is a lengthy pause.]
VLAD. OK, the hour is getting late, and we have completed presentations from economics, natural resources and defense. Let’s wrap it up for today.
DIMITRI. But I haven’t finished the fourth part of my presentation, on the aftermath of nuclear war! What happens after the initial strike! The time-sequential aspects! Mop-up operations! Maintaining the peace!
VLAD. I’m sorry, Dimitri, but we will have to address that some other time. I have to get to another meeting. We sort-of got bogged down in details, but it was worthwhile. In any event, I have to go.
[Addressing the others.] Please revise the background document to be consistent with what we have discussed today. Your next steps are to work up objectives and plans to correspond to the policy and goals that we have discussed today. I believe that the discussion has been very useful. In our discussion, we departed a lot from the SWOT format. Try to use that format, if you can. Thank you very much.
SCENE. The time is twenty years after a global nuclear war. The location is an office in the Office of Planetary Management in Astoria, Oregon. Two people are present. Mrs. Olga Komarova is a human resources officer, who is interviewing a candidate, Peter, for a position in the Office. Madam Komarova is holding a dossier in her hand, reviewing Peter’s application
MRS OLGA KOMAROVA. Good morning, Peter. How are you today?
PETER. I am fine, Madam Komarova. Thank you.
KOMAROVA. Peter, you have applied for the position of Resource Development Officer in the Office of Planetary Management. You are a recent graduate of university and have completed your two years of required military service. This will be your first permanent position.
I see from your résumé that you performed quite well as a seaman. You could have continued in the military. Why did you not choose to do so?
PETER. I found the work challenging and interesting, Madam Komarova, but I found the long postings to be difficult. Military service involves short-term postings, and a lot of relocation. Most of the seamen in my unit were serving their required time, like me. Not many were long term. I would prefer a land position, where I can have a permanent home and a stable family life.
KOMAROVA. I can understand that. Tell me about your military work.
PETER. Yes, Madam. I spent most of the time on the La Plata River between Uruguay and Argentina, on river patrol. I was attached to the Regional Outpost in Colonia del Sacramento. Our patrol boat monitored the river, and escorted supply ships. We patrolled from Punta del Este to Mercedes.
KOMAROVA. Did you see any action?
PETER. No, Madam. Things were stable there. The duty was routine.
KOMAROVA. You did well at university. Your degree is in wildlife management. I can understand why you found river patrol limiting. Tell me, Peter, why are you interested in this position, Resource Development Officer, and why here, in Astoria?
PETER. I read about the plan to restore the Interior Plains in North America – to reestablish the prairie, to reintroduce the bison, the wolf and feral mustangs on a large scale. To me, that project is worthwhile, and I would like to be a part of it. With my training in wildlife management, I feel that I can make a significant contribution to this effort.
KOMAROVA. Why do you think that this project is worthwhile?
PETER. Before the war, the United States did much to destroy the Interior Plains. They destroyed the prairies, replacing them with massive farms. They wiped out the bison – both the plains bison and the woodland bison. They exterminated the grey wolf. They fenced in the prairie and plowed it. They pretty much wiped out the feral mustangs, which had added a lot to the continent and to human society on it. They destroyed the prairie grass and they destroyed the prairie. Before that, the Interior Plains of North America were a magnificent natural wonder. In my view, it is worth restoring. It can be restored, and I would like to help bring that about.
KOMAROVA. What do you think of Russia’s population policy?
PETER. I am not sure what you mean. My political views are conservative. I support the law. I support that policy.
KOMAROVA. What is your understanding of that policy?
PETER. I know the basic tenets.
KOMAROVA. Can you describe them to me?
PETER. Certainly. The main tenets of Russian population policy are the following:
1. There shall be no cities of population over 100,000, except perhaps in Russia.
2. There shall be no use of energy other than current solar energy, except in Russia.
3. All waste shall be recycled.
4. Permanent settlements may be located only within three miles of rivers that are navigable from the ocean.
KOMAROVA. That is correct. What are the major implications of that policy?
PETER. Basically, it is designed to keep global human population low. More specifically, it means that all interior land in the world may be used only by nomadic people, who exist by hunting and gathering. It also means, basically, that Russia is the only high-technology nation in the world. It is the only place where large cities may exist and nuclear power may be used. Outside of Russia, human activity is limited to subsistence agriculture along ocean shores and the banks of rivers that are navigable from the ocean.
KOMAROVA. Why the three-mile limit, along the ocean shore or river shores navigable from oceans?
PETER. So that all permanent settlements may be reached by Russian patrol boats. Such as the one I was on.
KOMAROVA. You have a correct understanding of the basic policy. Do you know why that policy exists? Why should Russia want to keep global population low?
PETER. Before the war, Earth’s population stood at over eight billion people. Industrial production had destroyed much natural habitat and seriously polluted the land, oceans and atmosphere. The industrial activity of large human numbers, enabled by use of fossil fuel, was destroying the biosphere and threatening human existence. Most of the eight billion people on the planet lived in poverty, deprivation, desperation and want.
There was no longer sufficient land for everyone. There was no free land anywhere. The planet was so crowded that only the wealthiest were able to access its natural wonders. A few people were fabulously wealthy. Most people lived in cities, many of more than a million people. The cities were plagued by crowding, disease, violence and crime. Many people worked in large factories at meaningless, repetitive, mind-numbing jobs. The work had little direct relevance to their survival – its purpose was to produce wealthy for the planet’s controllers. For most human beings, life was a living hell, with no hope. In the United States, almost one percent of the population was incarcerated in prisons, many for terms over ten years.
When the war occurred, Earth’s population plummeted to less than a billion, in just a few months. Russia was the sole remaining large high-tech nation. Its policy was to establish a planetary management system that would stop further massive change to the biosphere and assure long-term survival of the human species. Basically, the policy is to allow a single high-technology nation – Russia – and to limit energy use outside of Russia to current solar energy. That means that the world outside of Russia is low-technology – hunter-gatherer in the interior of continents and primitive agriculture along oceans and large rivers that flow to oceans. Russia’s role – its purpose and mission – is to operate a long-term-sustainable planetary management system. This system keeps global population at low levels.
KOMAROVA. How did the pre-war situation arise? A planet stuffed with billions of people living in misery. That is hard to conceive.
PETER. The global economic system was a system in which most people engaged in meaningless work to produce vast wealth for the planet’s controllers. The system produced a global population consisting of a very small proportion of very wealthy people, a small proportion of people of modest means, and a very large proportion of very poor people. The system was committed to growth, both of the population and industrial production. As the total population grew, the number of desperately poor people increased, but so too did the number of wealthy people and total wealth.
Through industrial production of food, the economic system enabled the population to grow to very high levels, so that most people on the planet no longer had access to an amount of land of size or quality sufficient to provide a good quality of life for their family, using natural methods such as hunting, gathering, herding or farming. Most people were slaves to the economic system, sentenced to lifetimes of meaningless work. For most people, the situation was hopeless. The most that they could hope for was to claw their way a little higher up the in the teeming mass of desperately poor people. They either worked within the system, or they perished. The global economic system was all-encompassing. It consumed the entire planet. There were no alternatives.
KOMAROVA. The poor outnumbered the wealthy by a tremendous factor. Why would they put up with such a cruel system, comprised of so many poor and so few well-off?
PETER. It is not entirely clear. Partly out of fear of the unknown. Party because the global economic system encompassed the entire planet – there was nothing outside the system, there was nowhere else to go or to seek refuge. Partly because they were brainwashed by the system into believing that a better life was possible only through the system, that by working harder within it and for it things would get better. They evidently did not realize that as the global economic system grew, and human population grew along with it, it was in fact crowding the available space with ever more people and destroying the biosphere.
Enslavement. Indoctrination. Ignorance. Fear. Inertia. Evil leaders. Human greed. All of these things were factors. I’m not sure I understand why it happened – history tells how, not so much why. Perhaps it was destined to happen. Perhaps mankind had to pass through that terrible phase, to have the wisdom to change things for the better.
KOMAROVA. Peter, everything that you have described about the global economic system is negative. It is difficult to accept that a global system could exist for very long at all, if it had no positive benefits associated with it. Do you have anything good to say about it?
PETER. Well, the first thing that I would say would be that it did not last very long at all – a few hundred years. Compared to the timespan of human existence, that is but an instantaneous blip. Second, a growth-based economic system is an exponential process. Exponential processes are like explosions – they do not last very long. Without a mechanism to stop the exponential growth, the system was bound to self-destruct. Third, the large global economic system did in fact produce a very positive benefit – the tremendous explosion of knowledge that it made possible.
Without a substantial economic surplus, society does not possess the wherewithal to support its thinkers – its mathematicians, scientists and philosophers. The economic system enabled us to acquire a good understanding of the universe and our place in it. This would not have happened had human society continued as hunter-gatherers, or even as primitive agriculturalists and herders. The economic system did not serve only the wealthy – it served all mankind in enabling the acquisition of a massive amount of knowledge in a short time. The fact that it brought about an extreme distribution of wealth, and caused billions to live in poverty and deprivation, is the cost that had to be endured for this very significant benefit to happen.
Without the incentive for acquiring wealth, the wealthy would not have worked hard to build the global economic system and make it grow. Without the massive amount of wealth generated by the system, the means would not have been available to support the science establishment. The suffering of the poor, who generated the wealth, was not in vain – what you see today is the direct result of their contribution.
In short, the global economic system was not all bad. It was causing substantial destruction of the biosphere and therefore could not continue long. But before its collapse it did enable mankind to acquire great knowledge. The universe appears always to evolve to greater complexity. The rise of the global economic system may have been inevitable. Its collapse surely was. In any event, its existence was very useful to mankind. It enabled us to set up the current planetary management system.
KOMAROVA. The present system includes both hunter-gatherers and primitive agriculture. It appears that mankind’s problems started with the move to agriculture. Do you see a role for agriculture outside of Russia? Or just hunting and gathering?
PETER. Primitive, household-level agriculture, such as practiced by individuals or small tribes, is reasonable. It can lead to a meaningful and happy lifestyle. The system that generates much poverty and hardship is the use of agriculture to support a large number of people. The controllers then keep the farmers working full time to produce food for as many people as possible. This arrangement keeps the farmer in poverty, deprivation and hardship. Industrialization and commercialization of agriculture are extensions and implementations of this concept. As long as the agricultural product is used only by the people who raised it – by their immediate families or local communities – there is no problem. It is when it is attempted to use the agricultural product to support other people, remote from the producers, that the problems begin.
To answer you directly, I see a role for household-level agriculture, but not for commercial agriculture, outside of Russia.
KOMAROVA. I am afraid that we got a little off track. I had originally asked what happened to change things, to get rid of the economic system that had such a grip on the planet. What in fact happened to change that? What is different now?
PETER. Well, the war changed everything. It gave Russia the opportunity to set up a well-functioning and biosphere-friendly planetary management system. The situation is radically different from before. There are now no cities of size over 100 thousand people, anywhere on the planet, even in Russia. Economic poverty is unknown. Disease and violence are at low levels. Prisons are gone. Public shaming or shunning is used for minor offenses, and banishment is used instead of capital punishment for serious offenses. Most people on the planet lead meaningful lives. All people have access to land and water, if they want it. Outside of Russia, there is no private ownership of land.
No one is required to do any job that he objects to. If he is not satisfied, he can leave, strike out on his own, leave Russia. If you don’t like things now, there is an alternative – you can leave. There is a whole, empty planet you can go to, if you wish. Everyone in Russia now is there because they want to be. They are, in general, happy. Most of the world outside of Russia is empty. We have reset the biosphere to the way it was prior to the industrial revolution – a limited amount of agriculture and the interiors of most continents occupied by hunter-gatherers.
KOMAROVA. Your description is accurate. Do you know how the population policy is implemented, enforced? How is human population kept low?
PETER. Yes, I do know. In the military, we were trained in enforcement. The Russian military establishment possesses a strong navy, air force, and army. We have nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missiles that can reach and destroy any large city. We have nuclear-powered ships that access the shores of all continents. We have river craft that can reach all permanent settlements. We have nuclear-powered and solar-powered drones that can support global communications and aerial photography of the entire planet.
KOMAROVA. You have certainly done your homework, Peter. You have a good understanding of the current planetary situation, how it developed, and Russia’s role in operating a planetary management system that can assure a long-term-sustainable biosphere and human society.
From what we have discussed, I believe that you are a strong candidate for the position. You appear to be enthusiastic about the project, and you have the education to be able to contribute to it. As you know, the purpose of this interview with me is for me to meet you briefly. You will now continue with in-depth interviews with other staff members, for the remainder of the day. Good luck!
PETER. Thank you very much, Madam Komarova, for the opportunity of meeting with you. Good-day.
SCENE. The time is 500 years in the future. The location is somewhere on the Great Plains of the United States. It is evening. A man and wife are seated in front of a teepee, in native costume. It is early evening. A buffalo robe lies nearby.
MAN. Wife, how was your day today?
WOMAN. Dear, it was a good day. The children played. I spent some time with Mother. We had a good talk. I worked on your shirt. I have finished tanning the leather and am ready to cut it to size. I can take the size from your old shirt, or modify it if you wish.
MAN. The old one fits fine. Perhaps make the neck a little looser.
WOMAN. OK, I will do that. How was your day? Did the hunt go well?
MAN. Yes, very well. The buffalo are plentiful. We killed one, but then the herd bolted. We chased them for a while, but we did not want to tire our ponies. We will go out again tomorrow. I need to fletch more arrows.
WOMAN. The meat that you brought back is good. I cooked some of it for this meal, and will dry the rest.
MAN. Good.
[A pause in speaking.]
WOMAN. Where did you get the rabbit?
MAN. Just before we got back to camp.
WOMAN. Who got the buffalo hide?
MAN. Don arranged the hunt. The hide is his.
WOMAN. Autumn is approaching, and we could use another hide.
MAN. OK, I will arrange the next hunt. The next hide will be for you.
[The two remain silent for a while, drinking.]
MAN. Our life is very good. The game is plentiful. It is good to be free, to be able to go anywhere on the plains, any time we wish.
WOMAN. Yes, life is very good.
[They remain silent for a while.]
WOMAN. Did you hear that two agents came by today? A man and a woman.
MAN. No, I did not know that. What happened?
WOMAN. It had been several months since an agent had visited, and they wanted information on what had happened since then. It was the standard questions about where we had camped, how plentiful the game was, and whether we had had any encounters with strangers. We told them about the ruckus last month, and they asked for details on it.
The woman wanted to know about health. She asked about any health problems we had had. She then examined those who agreed. She asked each of us how happy we were. We told her that we were very happy.
MAN. Was that all?
WOMAN. No, they asked, as usual, whether the tribe wished to send any child or children for education.
MAN. And what was the answer?
WOMAN. We said not at present, but if a child were orphaned it would be considered.
MAN. Are they still here?
WOMAN. No, they are gone now. Before they left, they asked whether anyone wanted news from outside. We said yes, and they told us much. Someone asked about the old times, and they told us about that. Did you know that evil people once destroyed all of the buffalo?
MAN. I had heard that once, but I did not believe it. We cannot live without buffalo. We would have perished. Do you believe that?
WOMAN. Yes, I believe that it is true. The prairie was empty.
MAN. But there are plenty of buffalo. Millions of them. Everywhere. That belies what you say.
WOMAN. What happened is that a great man, Lord Vlad, conquered the evil men who destroyed the buffalo. A few buffalo remained in special places, and Lord Vlad reintroduced them to the plains. Along with the ponies.
MAN. Well, if that is true, then bless you, Lord Vlad.
FndID(232)
FndTitle(The Planet Master, A Radio Play)
FndDescription(The Planet Master, A Radio Play)
FndKeywords(radio play; global war; world government; long-term-survivable human population and biosphere of Earth)